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THE ACCIDENTAL AGENCY? 
Sapna Kumar

 
Abstract 
This Article presents a new model for examining the role of the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) with regard to patent 
law, positing that the Federal Circuit behaves like an agency and serves as 
the de facto administrator of the Patent Act. The Federal Circuit has 
traditionally engaged in a form of substantive rulemaking by issuing 
mandatory bright-line rules that bind the public. In reviewing patent agency 
appeals, the Federal Circuit acts more like an agency than a court by 
minimizing agency deference through the manipulation of standards of 
review and administrative law doctrines. This position of administrator 
raises several concerns. Supreme Court intervention has jeopardized the 
Federal Circuit’s ability to continue engaging in substantive rulemaking, 
calling into question the sustainability of the lower court’s role as 
administrator. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit is caught between the 
Supreme Court’s goal to unify administrative law and Congress’s goal to 
unify patent law. These problems suggest that a confrontation between the 
Supreme Court and Congress is inevitable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passes legislation, it relies on other entities to interpret 
and clarify complex statutory language. Almost always, Congress grants an 
agency substantive rulemaking authority to serve this purpose.
1
 This 
delegation of power allows the government to respond quickly to societal 
and legal changes without compromising separation of powers. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 1. One notable exception—besides patent law—is antitrust law. Both the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission lack substantive rulemaking authority over the key 
provisions of the antitrust statutes. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of 
Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 841 (2006) (“The DOJ 
enjoys no express or implicit grant of rulemaking authority within the antitrust realm. Though in 
theory one could argue that the FTC enjoys rulemaking authority in the competition context, it is 
not clear that position would prevail, and as a practical matter it is equally unlikely the FTC would 
advance such a position.”); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: 
An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 
65 (2009) (noting that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice “has no substantive 
rulemaking authority to speak of”). 
2
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At first glance, the Patent Act appears to be an outlier. The Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) administers the Patent Act,
2
 but lacks authority to 
interpret the substantive provisions of the statute.
3
 However, close scrutiny 
reveals that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) 
serves as a de facto administrator, notwithstanding the fact that it is an Article 
III court.
4
 This role appears to have emerged from the court’s specialization5 
and its mandate from Congress to promote uniformity in patent law.
6
 
The Federal Circuit engages in two agency-like functions: 
promulgating substantive rules and adjudicating disputes. The court has 
historically engaged in a form of rulemaking by issuing mandatory bright-
line rules.
7
 These rules have varied in subject matter, from requiring 
district courts to grant injunctions when a patent is infringed, to requiring 
that all method patents be tied to a machine or involve a transformation.
8
 
These rules function like substantive rules, in that they bind district courts, 
the PTO, and the public.
9
  
The Federal Circuit also engages in an aggressive form of adjudication 
that resembles agency review of a subordinate administrative law judge. 
Typically, judicial review of agencies is deferential. The Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) requires courts to review agency determinations of 
fact and policy with varying degrees of deference.
10
 This duty to defer 
stems from the unique advantages that agencies possess and has been 
                                                                                                                     
 2. Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1570 & n.122 
(2011) (noting that “the PTO alone administers the Patent Act” and discussing why experts believe 
that the PTO administers the entire Patent Act).  
 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (granting the PTO substantive rulemaking authority over the 
conduct of proceedings within the PTO, but failing to grant power to interpret the remainder of the 
Patent Act); see also Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 603 (2012) (citing 
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (discussing how limitations 
in the PTO’s substantive rulemaking authority emerged out of the Federal Circuit). 
 4. The Federal Circuit shares many features of Article I courts. As Professor Elizabeth 
Winston has observed, the court possesses the power to remove Article I Court of Federal Claims 
judges for “incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, engaging in the practice of law, or physical 
or mental disability,” a power that one generally associates with the legislative branch. Elizabeth I. 
Winston, Differentiating the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 813, 830–31 (2011) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 176 (2006)). It is “unclear” why “the Federal Circuit holds this power.” Id. at 833. 
Furthermore, the court’s jurisdiction “is defined not by territory, but by subject matter.” Id. at 815 
& n.10 (listing the subject matters over which the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction). 
 5. See infra Section II.A. 
 6. See infra Section I.D. 
 7. See infra Section II.B. 
 8. See infra Section II.C. 
 9. See infra Section II.D; see also Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The 
Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 744–749 (2011) (arguing that when the Federal 
Circuit hears cases en banc, it engages in a form of substantive rulemaking). 
 10. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (providing the standards of review for questions of law and 
questions of fact in both formal and informal agency proceedings). 
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recognized by the Supreme Court in cases such as Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council.
11
  
The Federal Circuit, however, has resisted giving deference to 
administrative patent decisions. It has denied that the review provisions of 
the APA apply to the PTO,
12
 has disregarded Supreme Court 
administrative law precedent,
13
 and has construed mixed questions of law 
and fact as pure questions of law to enable it to engage in de novo 
review.
14
 By reviewing patent agency decisions heavy-handedly, the 
Federal Circuit has acted like the head of an agency reining in wayward 
administrative law judges.  
The Federal Circuit’s unorthodox role has pros and cons. By reviewing 
almost all patent appeals, the court occupies a unique position, allowing it 
to bring uniformity to patent law.
15
 Allowing the court to freely overturn 
agency decisions with which it disagrees further strengthens this role. The 
current system, however, may enable the Federal Circuit to impermissibly 
exercise executive branch power in order to enrich the court.
16
  
                                                                                                                     
 11. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (noting the Court has “long recognized” the strong deference 
entitled to an agency by its reviewing court when the agency interprets ambiguous language in the 
statute entrusted to it); see, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 
U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (“Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the 
administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue 
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (“If an order is valid only 
as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it 
has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.”). 
 12. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that § 706 of the APA 
does not apply to Federal Circuit review of PTO decisions), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 
527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999). 
 13. See infra Section I.C. 
 14. See infra Section III.B; see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of 
the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 301 
(2007) (observing that the Federal Circuit tends to turn questions of fact and policy into questions 
of law in order to review such issues de novo). 
 15. Administrative law scholars have argued that judicial deference to agencies promotes 
uniformity. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California 
Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1204 (1995) (arguing that judicial deference to 
agencies promotes uniformity); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some 
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987) (“When national uniformity in the administration of national 
statutes is called for, the national agencies responsible for that administration can be expected to 
reach single readings of the statutes for which they are responsible and to enforce those readings 
within their own framework . . . . By removing the responsibility for precision from the courts of 
appeals, the Chevron rule subdues this diversity, and thus enhances the probability of uniform 
national administration of the laws.”). However, these arguments were with regard to agencies 
whose decisions are potentially appealed to multiple courts of appeals, and not just to a single court. 
 16. The Supreme Court has spoken against actions taken by Congress “to increase its own 
powers at the expense of the Executive Branch.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988). It is 
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A more pressing question is whether the Federal Circuit’s agency-like 
role is sustainable. To be an effective administrator, the Federal Circuit 
needs the power to create binding bright-line rules. But the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly rejected the use of these rules, thereby reducing the lower 
court’s ability to provide uniformity in patent law.17 Moreover, in Mayo 
Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, the 
Supreme Court rejected specialized rules for judicial review of tax 
decisions and reaffirmed its position against exceptionalism in 
administrative law.
18
 This decision raises the question of how long the 
Federal Circuit will be able to flout core principles of administrative law to 
promote uniformity in patent law. 
This Article presents a new model for examining the role of the Federal 
Circuit, positing that the court behaves like an executive branch agency 
and serves as the de facto administrator of the Patent Act. Part I provides 
background on the APA and discusses the powers of the two agencies that 
handle patent issues: the PTO and the International Trade Commission 
(ITC). It also discusses how the Federal Circuit’s predecessor began the 
trend of minimizing deference to agency patent decisions and considers 
how Congress’s decision to create the Federal Circuit had the unintended 
consequence of encouraging the court to take power from patent agencies. 
Part II discusses how the Federal Circuit’s specialized nature facilitates 
the issuance of bright-line rules and how the Supreme Court has restricted 
such rules. It then argues that these bright-line rules are the functional 
equivalent of substantive rulemaking, given that they are rigid and bind 
third parties, such as district courts and the PTO. Part III examines how the 
Federal Circuit has exerted control over the PTO and ITC by minimizing 
deference and resisting the proper application of both the APA and 
administrative law precedent. Part IV explores the sustainability of the 
Federal Circuit model, given the tension between unifying administrative 
law and unifying patent law. It further suggests that the competing 
objectives of Congress and the Supreme Court will need to be resolved in 
the future. 
I.  A MANDATE OF UNIFORMITY 
To understand how the Federal Circuit acts like an agency, it is 
necessary to understand some background underlying administrative law 
and the creation of the Federal Circuit. The APA was originally passed in 
                                                                                                                     
unclear, however, what limitations there are on a court that takes power from the executive branch. 
 17. See infra Section II.C. 
 18. 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) (holding that “[t]he principles underlying our decision in 
Chevron apply with full force in the tax context” and noting that the Court saw “no reason why our 
review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same 
extent as our review of other regulations”). 
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1946 to limit the power of agencies created during the New Deal.
19
 But the 
statute also served the purpose of creating uniformity in administrative 
law—a point that the Supreme Court would later emphasize when scolding 
the Federal Circuit for failing to review PTO decisions with appropriate 
deference.
20
 
Congress also sought uniformity in patent law. Until 1982, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) heard all patent appeals from the 
PTO and ITC.
21
 Under the leadership of Judge Giles Rich, the CCPA took 
an increasingly non-deferential approach to the review of such cases.
22
 
However, patent litigation was handled by the regional circuits, leading to 
circuit splits and widespread forum-shopping.
23
 
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to promote uniformity in 
patent litigation,
24
 but failed to consider the effect the court would have on 
the PTO and ITC. This failure was compounded when the Federal Circuit 
adopted the CCPA’s anti-PTO precedent.25 Inadvertently, Congress 
undermined the unification of administrative law, and set the Federal 
Circuit on a collision course with the Supreme Court. 
Sections A and B of this Part provide a brief overview of the APA, as 
well as the PTO and ITC. Section C discusses the history of the CCPA, and 
discusses how Judge Rich led a philosophical revival of the court that 
changed the relationship between the judiciary and the PTO. Section D 
notes that Congress created the Federal Circuit to promote uniformity in 
patent law, and describes how that mandate may have led the court to act 
as a quasi-agency. 
A.  A Brief Overview of the Administrative Procedure Act 
The APA was a congressional response to the unbridled expansion of 
the regulatory state. During the New Deal, the number of agencies 
                                                                                                                     
 19. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996). 
 20. See infra Section III.A; see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999). 
 21. See Giles S. Rich, Thirty Years of This Judging Business, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 139, 140 
(1986). 
 22. See infra Section I.C. 
 23. See infra Section I.D. 
 24. See infra Section I.D. 
 25. As Professor Jeffrey Lefstin astutely observed, one of the Federal Circuit’s greatest 
problems is the precedent that it chose to adopt. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 
43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 847 (2010) (“But by adopting the precedent of its predecessor courts, the 
Federal Circuit adopted a body of patent law that had been designed for use by a particular court, 
the CCPA, in a particular context, the review of patentability decisions by the Patent Office. That 
act of adoption at once set the contours of the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence, and hence the 
contours of modern patent law.”) (citation omitted). 
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dramatically increased, creating concerns that these executive branch 
entities were operating unchecked.
26
 After much debate, the APA was 
passed in 1946 as a “fierce compromise,” which instituted strong oversight 
of agencies and implemented uniform judicial review.
27
 The final version 
of the bill exempted no agencies.
28
  
The APA provides guidelines for agency rulemaking and 
adjudication—two of the core functions that agencies perform. Section 553 
of the APA provides a rigid procedure for notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.
29
 When an agency clarifies ambiguities in its organic statute 
using this mechanism, it is potentially eligible for substantial deference 
from the reviewing court under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chevron 
and United States v. Mead Corp.
30
 As discussed below, the PTO is only 
permitted to use notice-and-comment rulemaking for passing procedural 
rules.
31
 
Sections 556 and 557 of the APA provide the procedure that must be 
used for formal adjudication.
32
 Formal adjudication is a trial-like hearing; 
it includes testimony by witnesses subject to cross-examination
33
 and the 
creation of a formal record.
34
 As with notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1560 (“Every legislator, both Roosevelt Democrats and 
conservatives, recognized that a central purpose of the proponents of administrative reform was to 
constrain liberal New Deal agencies.”).  
 27. See id. at 1670–72 (noting that, despite the unanimous support for the bill, members of 
Congress were torn with regard to whether the APA offered sufficient oversight of agencies and 
sufficient access to judicial review). 
 28. Consequently, the APA governs the PTO and the ITC. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 
150, 154–55 (1999) (holding that the review provisions of the APA apply to the PTO); Osram 
GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 505 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Rulings of the International 
Trade Commission are reviewed on the standard of the Administrative Procedure Act.”). 
 29. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 30. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001) (noting that “a very good 
indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional authorizations to 
engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which 
deference is claimed” and observing that the “overwhelming number” of Supreme Court cases 
applying Chevron deference involve “notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication”). 
 31. See infra Subsection I.B.1; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: 
From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2155 (2004) (observing 
that modern administrative rulemaking is subject to rigid procedural requirements in contrast to 
legislative statutemaking). 
 32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2006). These provisions also provide the procedure for formal 
rulemaking, which is rarely used by agencies. 
 33. Id. § 556(d) (“A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary 
evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required 
for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”). 
 34. Id. § 556(e) (“The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and 
requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive record for decision in accordance with 
section 557 of this title . . . .”). 
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when an agency interprets its ambiguous statute through formal 
adjudication, it is potentially eligible for Chevron deference.
35
  
When the ITC determines whether an imported good infringes a valid 
and enforceable U.S. patent, it engages in formal adjudication, in 
accordance with its organic statute.
36
 In contrast, the PTO generally lacks 
formal adjudicative authority
37
 and can only utilize poorly defined informal 
procedures when determining whether a patent should be granted.
38
 
The APA furthermore established uniform standards of review for 
agency actions. Under § 706, questions of law are reviewed de novo.
39
 In 
contrast, questions of fact are set aside only if found to be “arbitrary, 
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion” or “unsupported by substantial 
evidence.”40 Because questions of fact are reviewed more deferentially 
than questions of law, problems may arise when a court is confronted with 
a mixed question of law and fact. As discussed in Section III.B, the Federal 
Circuit often recharacterizes such mixed questions as pure questions of 
law, thereby enabling the court to grant less deference to the PTO and ITC 
on appeal.  
Although Congress passed the APA to gain control over the wayward 
administrative state, over time the statute became valued for instituting 
uniformity in the treatment of agencies. In the 1999 case Dickinson v. 
Zurko, the Supreme Court stressed “the importance of maintaining a 
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action” and held that 
the APA applied to the review of PTO decisions.
41
 In the 2011 Mayo 
Foundation decision, the Court held that “[t]he principles underlying our 
decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context,” and noted 
that the review of tax regulations should be “guided by agency expertise 
pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See supra note 30. 
 36. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006) (requiring the ITC to use formal adjudicative procedures 
under §§ 556 and 557 of the APA). 
 37. Oddly, the PTO is allowed to engage in formal adjudication for one situation: the 
suspension or exclusion of registered patent agents and attorneys from practice. See 35 U.S.C. § 32 
(2006) (noting that “[t]he Director may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or 
exclude” any person, agent, or attorney from practicing before the PTO). 
 38. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2006).  
 39. See id. § 706. 
 40. Id.; Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999). 
 41. Id. at 154–55. Professor Orin Kerr has argued that the APA should not apply to PTO 
decisions regarding the issuance of a patent because the patent system operates through private law 
mechanisms, such as contract, property, and tort law. 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 129 (2000). In 
particular, Kerr argues that a patent resembles a contract because there is an offer, acceptance, and 
consideration. Id. at 135. However, the process through which the APA was passed made clear that 
Congress did not intend to except patents. See Part III.A. For this reason, it does not appear that 
Congress intended to create a contract right. 
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regulations.”42 Thus, although the APA was originally designed to hold 
agencies accountable, it evolved into a tool for limiting judicial 
interference with executive branch authority.
43
 
B.  A Brief Overview of Patent Agency Powers 
1.  The Patent & Trademark Office 
The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that Congress granted the PTO 
“broad powers” over its own practice.44 The PTO is charged with granting 
and issuing patents and may establish regulations that “govern the conduct 
of proceedings in the Office.”45 These procedural rules are promulgated 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking and therefore bind patent 
applicants.
46
  
The Patent Act also established the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (BPAI) to hear appeals of patent rejections from examiners 
and to handle patent interferences.
47
 An inventor whose patent is rejected 
by the BPAI has the option to appeal either to a district court for further 
fact-finding or directly to the Federal Circuit.
48
 
The PTO notably lacks substantive rulemaking authority over the 
Patent Act.
49
 It cannot use notice-and-comment rulemaking to clarify, for 
example, what constitutes patentable subject matter. Consequently, the 
Federal Circuit has granted Chevron deference to the PTO only when it has 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011). 
 43. See Zurko, 527 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he APA by its plain text 
was intended to bring some uniformity to judicial review of agencies by raising the minimum 
standards of review and not by lowering those standards which existed at the time.”). 
 44. Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 45. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006); accord Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 
930 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the powers of the PTO). 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B) (2006) (stating that PTO procedural rules “shall be made in 
accordance with section 553” of the APA). 
 47. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006). Note that the BPAI has been restructured as the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board under § 7 of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
§ 7(e), 125 Stat. 284, 315 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 145). 
 48. Such decisions originally appealed to the District Court for the District of Columbia, but 
now will go to the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under the AIA. Compare 35 
U.S.C. § 145 (2006), with 35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (West 2011). 
 49. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that “the 
broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers” under the Patent Act “authorizes the Commissioner to 
promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does NOT 
grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). Commentators have noted 
that the distinction between procedural and substantive rules is ambiguous, at best. See, e.g., Arti K. 
Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s Troubled Quest for 
Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2070–73 (2009) (discussing the “blurry line between 
substantive and procedural rules”). 
9
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“interpret[ed] statutory provisions relat[ed] to the conduct of proceedings 
in the Patent Office.”50  
It is important to note that under the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act 
of 2011 (AIA), the PTO did receive a variety of new responsibilities from 
Congress.
51
 For example, the Director of the PTO may now prescribe 
regulations related to post-grant review of patents and inter partes 
review.
52
 The grant of these powers may be an indication that Congress has 
greater trust in the PTO compared to twenty years ago.  
But Congress stopped short of allowing the PTO to interpret the core 
provisions of the Patent Act—those that affect the scope of what is 
patentable. Nor did Congress explicitly grant formal adjudicative power to 
the PTO, although the new hearings under the AIA do appear to be trial-
like.
53
 Thus, although the AIA represents an opportunity for the PTO to 
establish greater credibility in the patent community, Congress did not 
substantially alter the balance of power between the Federal Circuit and the 
PTO. In short, the Federal Circuit still retains the upper hand. 
2.  The International Trade Commission 
The ITC is an independent agency whose governing statute is the Tariff 
Act of 1930. Under § 337 of the Tariff Act, the ITC may issue exclusion 
orders blocking goods that infringe patents, copyrights, and trademarks 
from entering the United States;
54
 these orders are enforced by the Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland 
                                                                                                                     
 50. See Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335–37 (2008). 
 51. See Sarah Tran, supra note 3, at 612–23 (discussing the PTO’s new powers under the 
AIA). 
 52. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(c), 125 Stat. 284, 314 
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 141). 
 53. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for 
the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. XX (2013) (discussing how the AIA establishes trial-like 
proceedings for post-grant review proceedings), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2166560. Professor Wasserman proposes that such proceedings should be eligible for 
Chevron deference. If the Federal Circuit did grant such deference to PTO post-grant review, this 
would shift the dynamics dramatically. However, short of Supreme Court intervention, this seems 
unlikely. 
 54. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330(f) (2006) (“The Commission shall be considered to be an 
independent regulatory agency.”); About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.us 
itc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (“The United States International 
Trade Commission is an independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with broad investigative 
responsibilities on matters of trade.”); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2006) (declaring unlawful the sale for 
importation or sale after importation of goods that violate a valid and enforceable patent, copyright, 
or trademark); id. § 1337(d)(1) (“If the Commission determines . . . that there is a violation of this 
section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of 
this section, be excluded from entry into the United States . . . .”). 
10
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Security.
55
 This power arises under § 337(a) of the Tariff Act, which was 
enacted to protect domestic companies against the harsh effects of free 
trade.
56
 These exclusion orders are highly valued by patent holders, 
because injunctive relief in district courts is limited.
57
 Final decisions from 
the ITC may be appealed to the Federal Circuit.
58
 
Unlike the PTO, the ITC is powerful. It is the administrator of the 
Tariff Act and has the power to engage in formal adjudication under the 
APA.
59
 Moreover, an argument can be made that ITC patent validity and 
enforceability determinations should be entitled to deference under 
Chevron.
60
 Nevertheless, as discussed in Section IV.D, the Federal Circuit 
takes a heavy-handed approach to reviewing the ITC’s patent decisions, 
and actively minimizes deference to it. 
C.  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
From 1929 to 1982, the five-judge CCPA reviewed all appeals from 
final judgments of the PTO and the ITC, in addition to appeals from the 
U.S. Customs Court.
61
 The CCPA was an unusual court in several respects. 
Although it was created as a specialized Article I court,
62
 Congress 
                                                                                                                     
 55. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006); 19 C.F.R. § 12.39 (2008). 
 56. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 529, 542–44 (2009) (discussing how the creation of the ITC reflected a compromise 
between free trade supporters and protectionists, liberalizing trade but punishing unfair competition 
by foreign entities). 
 57. Under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., a district court can only grant injunctive relief 
if a four-part balancing test is met. 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). That decision, however, does not 
apply to the ITC. Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (2010) (“Given the 
different statutory underpinnings for relief before the Commission in Section 337 actions and before 
the district courts in suits for patent infringement, this court holds that eBay does not apply to 
Commission remedy determinations under Section 337.”). 
 58. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2006). 
 59. Id. (“Each determination under subsection (d) or (e) of this section shall be made on the 
record after notice and opportunity for a hearing in conformity with the provisions of subchapter II 
of chapter 5 of title 5 [of the APA].”). 
 60. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1562–85; see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 229–30 (2001) (noting that “a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment 
[is] express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that 
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed” and observing that the 
“overwhelming number” of Supreme Court cases applying Chevron deference involve “notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication”). 
 61. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 362 
n.135 (2012) (discussing the jurisdiction of the CCPA). The U.S. Customs Court was later replaced 
by the Court of International Trade. Rich, supra note 21, at 141. 
 62. In 1929, the Supreme Court held that the CCPA was an Article I court. Ex parte Bakelite 
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 460 (1929) (“[I]t is plain that the Court of Customs Appeals is a legislative 
and not a constitutional court.”). 
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converted it to an Article III court in 1958.
63
 Congress explained the 
conversion by noting that the court was “exercising judicial rather than 
administrative power,”64 though it is unclear what changed in the court’s 
mission. Second, although patent cases by one account comprised 80%–
85% of the CCPA’s docket,65 the CCPA judges were primarily politically 
connected individuals who had no prior knowledge of patent law.
66
 
In the 1960s, the CCPA began to experience a transformation that 
ultimately led to a more hands-on review of the PTO. Early CCPA 
decisions emphasized the need to defer to the PTO’s expertise. For 
example, in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme Court examined eighty-nine 
pre-APA CCPA decisions.
67
 The Court noted that in “nearly half” of those 
cases, the CCPA used the “manifest error” standard of review because of 
the PTO’s expertise and the PTO’s ability to “deal with technically 
complex subject matter.”68 It further observed that “[i]n more than three-
fourths of the cases[,] the CCPA” found that deference to PTO fact-finding 
was warranted because two or more PTO tribunals had agreed on the 
facts.
69
 Thus, the early CCPA showed deference to the PTO,
70
 recognizing 
the agency’s superior knowledge of patent law and technology. 
Two major factors, however, contributed to a shift in CCPA 
jurisprudence. In 1952, Congress overhauled the Patent Act. The new Act 
was not drafted by any members of Congress, but rather by then-patent 
practitioner Giles Rich and Patent Office Examiner-In-Chief Pasquale 
Federico; the Patent Act passed both houses of Congress without any 
debate.
71
 Because Congress failed to grant the PTO interpretive rulemaking 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 526 (1966) (noting that Congress declared “the CCPA 
‘a court established under article III . . . ,’ that is, a constitutional court exercising judicial rather 
than administrative power” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1964)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Rich, supra note 21, at 140–41. Note the portion of Judge Rich’s essay that lists the 
statistic of the CCPA’s docket lacks citations.  
 66. Id. at 142. 
 67. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999). 
 68. Id. at 160. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Lynn E. Eccleston & Harold C. Wegner, The Rich-Smith Years of the U.S. Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, 3 J. FED. CIRCUIT HIST. SOC’Y 49, 50 (2009) (noting that the pre-Rich 
CCPA “had been largely a rubber stamp for decisions of the Patent Office”). 
 71. According to former CCPA and Federal Circuit Judge Giles S. Rich, “[t]he New Patent 
Act went through both houses on consent calendars, and those houses relied on the unanimous 
recommendations of their respective committees.” Neil A. Smith, Remembrances and Memorial: 
Judge Giles Sutherland Rich 1904–1999, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 163, 166 (2000); 
see also Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, 14 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 181, 181–82 
(2004) (reprinted from NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:201–
1:213 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980)) (discussing how Rich and Federico drafted the 1952 Patent 
Act). 
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authority over the substantive provisions of the Patent Act, the CCPA was 
uniquely positioned to make key choices regarding implementation.  
Second, in 1956, Giles Rich became the first judge with patent 
expertise appointed to the CCPA;
72
 he had practiced as a patent attorney 
for several decades, written law review articles in the field, and co-drafted 
the 1952 Patent Act.
73
 A few years later, Judge Arthur Smith was 
appointed to the bench.
74
 Judge Smith also had patent expertise, and 
together, the two judges were able to start influencing the court.
75
 This 
power shift, combined with the newly passed Patent Act, had a substantial 
effect on the court’s jurisprudence. 
As Professor Jeffery Lefstin observes, under the guidance of Judge 
Rich, the CCPA’s judicial philosophy became one of maintaining control 
over the PTO and providing legitimacy for the court’s actions.76 Judge 
Rich noted, “In the CCPA, we were not reviewing trials, and Rule 52(a) 
was not applicable. Or if it was, we ignored it. Reviewing the PTO Boards, 
our attitude was we reversed them if they were wrong.”77 The CCPA was 
able to maintain this high level of control over the PTO by virtue of the 
fact that PTO decisions could only be appealed to that court. 
In maintaining this control, the CCPA flagrantly disregarded 
administrative law. It failed to acknowledge that the APA applies to the 
PTO, except in the context of standing.
78
 Instead, as Judge Rich observed, 
the CCPA arbitrarily reversed the PTO, not sticking to any one standard 
and certainly not following the APA.  
                                                                                                                     
 72. See Rich, supra note 21, at 142–43 (noting that the patent bar had become “fed up” with 
the fact that no judge with intellectual property experience had been appointed to the CCPA and 
subsequently worked to have Giles S. Rich appointed); Lefstin, supra note 25, at 848 n.21. 
 73. James F. Davis, Judge Giles S. Rich: His Life and Legacy Revisited, LANDSLIDE, 
Sept./Oct. 2009, at 8, 9–10. 
 74. Lefstin, supra note 25, at 848 n.21. 
 75. See Eccleston & Wegner, supra note 70, at 51, 53 (noting that immediately following 
Judge Smith’s joining the CCPA, Judges Rich and Smith “established important precedents that 
became landmarks” and “transformed the CCPA” away from a court that once “routinely rubber 
stamped the Patent Office to a court that actively explored patent law doctrines”). 
 76. See Lefstin, supra note 25, at 857 (maintaining that after the passage of the 1952 Patent 
Act, “statutory fidelity” and “conceptual differentiation” were the CCPA’s key jurisprudential 
methods, which “provided doctrinal levers for the court to control the Patent Office’s decisions” 
and “provided legitimacy for the court’s exercise of that control”). 
 77. Rich, supra note 21, at 149 (emphasis added). 
 78. A search of all CCPA cases on Lexis with the terms (“PTO” or “patent w/5 office”) and 
“administrative procedure act” revealed only one PTO appeal where the APA was invoked in the 
context of standing. See In Re Kahn, Appeal No. 79-545, 1979 CCPA LEXIS 263, at *1 (April 18, 
1979) (holding that CCPA did not have jurisdiction over Kahn’s challenge to the PTO’s decision to 
strike his reissuance application on the grounds of collateral estoppel, and that such a suit needed to 
be filed in district court under section 702 of the APA). See also Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1455 
(observing that notwithstanding the passage of the APA, the CCPA continued to review patent 
decisions “without a clearly articulated standard of review”). 
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This attitude carried over to the Federal Circuit, brought in part by the 
judges who came from the CCPA and Court of Claims.
79
 Judge Rich—
who became one of the inaugural Federal Circuit judges—acknowledged 
that the Federal Circuit engaged in “de novo fact finding and delving into 
the record on our own when we should not.”80 He recognized that he was 
“probably one of the offenders.”81 But he defended the practice, stating: “I 
do not know how one can decide whether a finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous without delving into the record, and surely we have the right to 
make such a decision.”82 
The Federal Circuit cemented this position with its first decision, 
adopting CCPA caselaw as controlling precedent
83
 and disregarding the 
precedent of the regional circuits. In doing so, the Federal Circuit adopted 
the CCPA’s non-deferential approach to reviewing PTO and ITC 
decisions. As Federal Circuit Judge Jay Plager remarked in 1993:  
I thought the PTO was an administrative agency. But we don’t 
review it as if it is. There is no other administrative agency in 
the United States that I know of in which the standard of 
review over the agency’s decisions gives the appellate court 
as much power over the agency as we have over the PTO.
84
 
Thus, the acts of the defunct CCPA continue to influence the Federal 
Circuit with regard to the review of PTO decisions. 
D.  The Creation of the Federal Circuit 
Although the idea of Congress’s creating a national court for patent 
appeals had been around since the late nineteenth century,
85
 the idea did 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, § 165, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 50 
(1982) (“The judges of the United States Court of Claims and of the United States Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals in regular active service on the effective date of this Act shall continue 
in office as judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”). 
 80. Rich, supra note 21, at 149. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
 84. Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1415 
(1995) (quoting S. Jay Plager, An Interview with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, 5 J. PROPRIETARY 
RTS. 2, 5 (1993)); see also Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 831, 834 (2012) (discussing how unusually weak the PTO is compared to other 
federal agencies). 
 85. Paul M. Janicke, To Be Or Not To Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (1887-1982), 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 645 (2001) (“Bills in Congress to 
create a national court for patent appeals had appeared as early as 1887, and the specific mechanism 
for fashioning a patent-and-other-things court by expanding the jurisdictions of preexisting courts 
was debated since 1906.”) 
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not gain traction until the 1970s. By 1977, the Senate was considering two 
bills to create a National Court of Appeals.
86
 In 1978, the Department of 
Justice’s Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice 
proposed a merger of the CCPA and the United States Court of Claims to 
handle patent and tax appeals.
87
 This proposal was soon narrowed to 
encompass only patent litigation appeals.
88
 
During the debate on how to reform the judiciary, a common theme 
emerged regarding the need for uniformity in the patent system. Each court 
of appeals was faced with the task of interpreting the Patent Act, which 
gave rise to numerous circuit splits and disparate treatment of patents. For 
example, the Eighth Circuit invalidated 89% of all patents, whereas the 
Tenth Circuit invalidated only 30% of them.
89
  
The president-elect of the American Patent Law Association described 
the situation as a “crisis,” and linked a “decline of . . . technological 
superiority” in the United States to the ineffective patent litigation 
system.
90
 In the House Report for the Federal Courts Improvement Act, 
Congress stressed the problems of “undue forum-shopping and unsettling 
inconsistency in adjudications” stemming from patent appeals being heard 
in the regional circuits.
91
 It further noted that the “establishment of a single 
court to hear patent appeals was repeatedly singled out by the witnesses” as 
the best way to strengthen the patent system, and would provide 
“nationwide uniformity in patent law.”92 
Consequently, when Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1982 (FCIA),
93
 it gave the newly established Federal Circuit the 
mandate to unify patent law. Congress granted the Federal Circuit 
                                                                                                                     
 86. COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FED. JUDICIAL SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NEEDS OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 17–18 (1977), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4178233 (discussing 
two Senate bills under review by a subcommittee). 
 87. Janicke, supra note 85, at 654–55 (citing OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM (1978)). This idea surfaced 
again when the APA was being drafted. The 1935 ABA Committee report included a 
recommendation that a single administrative court be created covering the jurisdictions for Court of 
Claims, the Board of Tax Appeals, the Customs Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals. Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1575. 
 88. Janicke, supra note 85, at 658–59 (noting that the Senate passed a bill in 1979 removing 
any tax from the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, and that the House followed suit in 1980). 
 89. Lawrence Baum, The Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 758, 762 (1974). 
 90. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—1981: Hearing on H.R. 2405 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
97th Cong. 50 (1981) (statement of J. Jancin, Jr., President Elect Am. Patent Law Ass’n). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981). 
 92. Id. Note, however, that the decision to establish a national patent court was highly 
controversial. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1604. 
 93. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
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jurisdiction over the overwhelming majority of patent appeals,
94
 thereby 
allowing the court to shape patent law as it saw fit. The fact that numerous 
provisions of the Patent Act are highly ambiguous and that the PTO lacks 
interpretive authority over the substantive provisions made the new court’s 
position even stronger. 
Congress’s uniformity mandate, however, had unintended 
consequences. When Congress passed the FCIA, it paid attention to neither 
the PTO nor ITC.
95
 Yet, to unify patent law, rules were needed to interpret 
ambiguities in the Patent Act. This need would give rise to the use of 
bright-line rules in the Federal Circuit. Moreover, by declaring a need for 
uniform patent law, Congress opened the door to the Federal Circuit’s 
disregard of deferential review mandated in administrative law. Thus, 
Congress ultimately failed to see that the price of uniformity would be paid 
by the executive branch of government. 
II.  FEDERAL CIRCUIT RULEMAKING 
There are a number of reasons why Congress chooses to delegate 
power to an executive branch agency. Agencies possess subject-matter 
expertise and institutional advantages, and can deal with politically 
charged policy decisions.
96
 Instead of attempting to fine-tune a difficult 
area of law, Congress can pass a broad law and delegate substantive 
rulemaking authority to an agency.
97
 The agency can then engage in notice-
and-comment rulemaking under § 553 of the APA to fill gaps in its organic 
statute. 
Although the Federal Circuit is an Article III court, it is similarly 
situated to an agency. Congress entrusted the court with near-exclusive 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Originally, if the petitioner’s well-pleaded complaint did not assert a claim arising under 
patent law, the Federal Circuit would not have jurisdiction over the appeal. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002). However, under the AIA, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) was amended to state: “No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.” 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. Law 112-29. § 19(a), 125 Stat. 331 (2011). Also, the AIA 
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) to broaden the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to include appeals “in 
any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory 
counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.” Id. 
§ 19(b), 125 Stat. 331. 
 95. Kumar, supra note 2, at 1583.  
 96. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 
523, 534 (1992) (“There are numerous reasons for Congress’s willingness to delegate significant 
lawmaking power to agencies, including the institutional advantages agencies have in developing 
detailed policy prescriptions and the congressional inclination to avoid or defer controversial policy 
decisions.”). 
 97. The Supreme Court recognized Congress’s limitations in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), where it noted that “judges are not experts,” and 
therefore are not in the best position to engage in policy making. Id. at 865–66. 
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jurisdiction in interpreting a vague area of law. Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit has been dominated by patent specialists with a vested interest in 
shaping patent law.
98
 Consequently, the court has had strong motivation to 
address the lingering confusion that was caused by the passage of the 
Patent Act of 1952.
99
  
But how can a court engage in rulemaking? The Federal Circuit’s 
answer came in the form of bright-line rules. Encouraged by the Supreme 
Court in the late 1990s, the Federal Circuit increasingly utilized rigid tests 
that bound not just the parties, but also district courts and the PTO. These 
tests were both legislative-like and forward-looking, thereby taking on 
characteristics of a substantive rule. Their effect was also similar to that of 
an agency rule, providing clarity and greater certainty to inventors, though 
at the expense of providing nuanced case-by-case decisionmaking. 
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has severely restricted the 
Federal Circuit’s use of such rules. This calls into question the Federal 
Circuit’s ability to continue administering the Patent Act. 
Section A of this Part discusses the specialized nature of the Federal 
Circuit and how this has promoted rulemaking. Section B describes the 
court’s increasing reliance on bright-line rules. Section C then discusses 
how the Supreme Court pushed back against these rules, beginning in 
1993. Finally, Section D argues that bright-line rules function as a form of 
rulemaking and that the Supreme Court’s rejection of bright-line rules 
jeopardizes the Federal Circuit’s ability to act as a de facto administrator. 
A.  Specialization 
It would be impossible for the Federal Circuit to engage in rulemaking 
on any meaningful scale without its specialized knowledge of patent law. 
Yet Congress did not intend for the Federal Circuit to become a specialized 
court.
100
 The House Judiciary Committee emphasized that the new court 
would have “a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues and 
types of cases.”101 The Committee also believed that appellate courts 
would establish rules regarding how to handle ancillary and pendent patent 
claims,
102
 implying that other courts would continue to hear patent cases. 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Initially, this patent expertise came from the five CCPA judges who joined the Federal 
Circuit in 1982. Over time, more judges with patent backgrounds would be appointed to the court. 
See supra Section I.C. 
 99. See, e.g., Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of 
Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 804–07 (2008) (discussing the 
“segmented approach” of the 1952 Act); Harold C. Wegner, The Disclosure Requirements of the 
1952 Patent Act: Looking Back and a New Statute for the Next Fifty Years, 37 AKRON L. REV. 243 
(2004) (discussing changes to § 112 under the 1952 Act). 
 100. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 41. 
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Although only one-third of the Federal Circuit’s docket is patent law,103 
the remainder does not attract nearly as much attention. No judge appears 
to have been appointed to the court because of his or her expertise in 
veterans affairs, government contracts, or personnel law.
104
 One might 
have expected trade to have played a larger role in Federal Circuit 
appointments as well, given that the Federal Circuit reviews decisions from 
the Court of International Trade and the ITC. Yet it was not until President 
Barack Obama appointed Judge Jimmie Reyna in 2011 that the court 
received its first trade expert.
105
  
Four of the ten active judges had patent backgrounds prior to joining 
the Federal Circuit. Judge Kimberly Moore was a patent law professor and 
clerked for Judge Glen Archer on the Federal Circuit.
106
 Judge Alan Lourie 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See Tony Dutra, “Introspective Look” at Federal Circuit Highlights Breadth of Court’s 
Docket, 77 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 560, 560 (2009) (noting that 31% of the Federal 
Circuit’s docket is intellectual property cases, nearly all of which involve patents); John M. Golden, 
The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in 
Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 665 (2009) (“Patent appeals typically form only about a third of 
the court’s docket.”). 
 104. See Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, State of the Court Address at the Judicial Conference for 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1–2 (May 20, 2010), http://www.cafc.us 
courts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2010/stateofthecourt10.pdf  (“I note that our court lacks 
anyone from West of the Allegheny Mountains, any Asian-American or African-American and 
anyone appointed who has specialized in contract, international trade, veterans or personnel law.”); 
see also Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit’s 2010 Government Contract 
Decisions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2011) (discussing the lack of judges with government 
contract experience). 
 105. See Cardin Applauds Confirmation of Marylander Jimmie Reyna to Federal Circuit 
Bench, (quoting Senator Ben Cardin as stating that “Mr. Reyna is an outstanding trade lawyer who 
brings over 20 years of invaluable international trade experience to a court that —while responsible 
for such adjudication—previously did not have an international trade expert among its ranks.”) 
available online at http://www.cardin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/cardin-applauds-
confirmation-of-marylander-jimmie-reyna-to-federal-circuit-bench. Jason Rantanen, Senate 
Confirms Jimmie V. Reyna to the CAFC, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 6, 2011, 11:13 AM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/04/senate-confirms-jimmie-v-reyna-to-the-cafc.html 
(discussing Judge Reyna’s international trade experience). President Obama also appointed Judge 
Kathleen O’Malley, who is the only judge in the history of the Federal Circuit who had previously 
served as a federal district court judge. See Biography of Kathleen M. O’Malley, Circuit Judge, 
U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kath leen-m-omalley-
circuit-judge.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Kathleen M. O’Malley]; Steven Schooner, 
A Random Walk: The Federal Circuit's 2010 Government Contracts Decisions, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 
1067, 1070 n.7 (2011) (observing that Judge O’Malley is the first district court judge to get elevated 
to the Federal Circuit). This is in contrast to other courts of appeal, where district court judges are 
frequently elevated to appellate courts.  
 106. Judicial Nominations, Judge Kimberly A. Moore, GEORGE W. BUSH WHITE HOUSE 
ARCHIVES, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/judicialnominees/moore.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2012); Biography of Kimberly A. Moore, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR 
FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kimberly-a-moore-circuit-judge.html (last 
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was both the Vice President of Corporate Patents and Trademarks, and 
Associate General Counsel of SmithKline Beecham Corporation; he was 
also the President of the Philadelphia Patent Law Association.
107
 Judge 
Pauline Newman served as director of the Patent, Trademark and Licensing 
Department at FMC Corp., and prior to that was a patent attorney.
108
 Judge 
Kathleen O’Malley, as a district court judge, presided over more than 100 
patent and trademark cases; she also served as judicial liaison to the Local 
Patent Rules Committee for the Northern District of Ohio and regularly 
taught a law school course on patent litigation.
109
 Also, Federal Circuit 
nominee Richard Taranto “participated in dozens of Federal Circuit patent 
appeals” as a litigator, argued three intellectual property cases before the 
Supreme Court, and taught patent law at Harvard.
110
 
Those judges who started out as non-specialists quickly developed 
patent expertise. For example, Chief Judge Randall Raider did not have a 
patent background before he became a Federal Circuit judge. However, he 
subsequently taught patent law and other intellectual property courses at 
several law schools, and has coauthored a patent law casebook.
111
 
This high level of specialization distinguishes the Federal Circuit from 
other Article III appellate courts. The court’s closest analog is the D.C. 
Circuit, which is highly regarded for its expertise in administrative law.
112
 
The D.C. Circuit is viewed as a feeder court to the Supreme Court, given 
that four of the current Justices were elevated from it.
113
 This allows the 
D.C. Circuit to attract highly qualified judges from a variety of 
backgrounds. However, all courts of appeal hear a substantial number of 
agency appeals, making the D.C. Circuit’s expertise less unusual than that 
                                                                                                                     
visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 107. Biography of Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/alan-d-lourie-circuit-judge.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 108. Biography of Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/pauline-newman-circuit-judge.html (last visited Sept. 28, 
2012). 
 109. Kathleen M. O’Malley, supra note 105. 
 110. Next Federal Circuit Judge Nominee: Richard G. Taranto, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 10, 2011, 
9:42 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/11/next-federal-circuit-judge-nominee-richard-g-
taranto.html. 
 111. Biography of Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/randall-r-rader-chief-judge.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 112. See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of 
Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (2010) (discussing the D.C. and 
Federal Circuits as being examples of semi-specialized courts, but acknowledging that “the Federal 
Circuit’s grip on patent appeals is much more complete than the D.C. Circuit’s grip on appeals 
involving administrative law.”). 
 113. Id. at 556 (noting that the D.C. Circuit “enjoys unmatched prestige” due in part to its 
status as a “feeder court” for the Supreme Court). 
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of the Federal Circuit. 
Consequently, the Federal Circuit is in the unique position of 
possessing sufficient competence in a single area of law allowing it to 
dramatically shape that area. As Part IV discusses, this expertise has led 
the court to second-guess the PTO and ITC, thereby overstepping its 
authority as an Article III court. 
B.  The Rise of Bright-Line Rules 
When Congress passes a statute and fails to delegate its interpretation 
to an agency, that power effectively passes to the courts.
114
 Thus, when 
Congress failed to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority over the 
key sections of the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit was well within its 
authority to step in and interpret ambiguities in the statute. The court’s 
preferred method of doing this is through mandatory bright-line rules that 
mimic substantive rulemaking.
115
 
Bright-line rules have existed since the early days of the Federal 
Circuit. For example, its presumption that an infringer is entitled to 
permanent injunctive relief dates back to 1983, when the court held that 
“where validity and continuing infringement have been clearly 
established . . . immediate irreparable harm is presumed” and that “[a] 
court should not be reluctant to use its equity powers once a party has so 
clearly established his patent rights.”116 The Federal Circuit also inherited 
bright-line rules when it adopted CCPA decisions as precedent.
117
 The 
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test was created by the CCPA to 
show whether a combination of prior art is obvious.
118
 Relying firmly on 
this precedent, the Federal Circuit established that this test was 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Professor Margaret Lemos has discussed judicially administered statutes at length. She 
notes that “[w]hen Congress enacts a statute, it inevitably resolves some policy disputes and leaves 
others open. All legislation leaves some residuum of policymaking power to the institution—court 
or agency—charged with administering it.” Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially 
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428 (2008) 
(citations omitted). 
 115. See infra Section II.D. 
 116. Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983), abrogated by 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), as recognized in Robert Bosch LLC 
v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1141, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 117. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). This decision had 
the effect of disregarding patent precedent from the regional circuits, including courts such as the 
Seventh Circuit that were highly respected by practitioners. 
 118. In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956–57 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (finding nothing in the record to 
suggest combining two prior art references and noting that “[t]he mere fact that it is possible to find 
two isolated disclosures which might be combined in such a way to produce a new compound does 
not necessarily render such production obvious unless the art also contains something to suggest the 
desirability of the proposed combination”). 
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mandatory.
119
 
The Federal Circuit did retain some more nuanced, policy-minded 
tests.
120
 For example, in the court’s early days, it noted that “[r]igid 
standards are especially unsuited to the on sale provision where the policies 
underlying the bar, in effect, define it.”121 It stated that “the facts of each 
case must be weighed in view of public policy,” balancing “prompt and 
widespread disclosure of inventions to the public” with giving the inventor 
sufficient time to determine whether to seek a patent.
122
 
In 1998, the Supreme Court sent a strong message that it preferred 
bright-line rules.
123
 In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, the unanimous Court 
announced a rule articulating when an invented device is “on sale” under 
§ 102(b) of the Patent Act.
124
 The Court held that the on-sale bar applies 
when the product is “the subject of a commercial offer for sale” and when 
the invention is “ready for patenting.”125 In that case—even though Wayne 
Pfaff’s invention had not been reduced to practice—the Court found the 
invention was ready for patenting, because Pfaff had provided the 
manufacturer with a description and drawings sufficient to allow a person 
skilled in the art to practice the invention.
126
  
The Court did not leave the Federal Circuit entirely unchecked. In 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., the en banc Federal 
Circuit held that prosecution history estoppel arises from any amendment 
                                                                                                                     
 119. See, e.g., ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (“Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce 
the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination. Under 
section 103, teachings of references can be combined only if there is some suggestion or incentive 
to do so.” (citing In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Regel, 526 F.2d 1399 
(C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Avery, 518 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Imperato, 486 F.2d 585 
(C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Andre, 341 F.2d 304 (C.C.P.A. 1965))). 
 120. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 778 
(2003) (noting that the Federal Circuit employed totality of the circumstances tests “[d]uring its first 
decade and well into its second”). 
 121. W. Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 122. Id. at 845. 
 123. As early as 1999, commentators predicted that Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, 525 U.S. 55 
(1998), would push the Federal Circuit toward bright-line rules. See Isabelle R. McAndrews, The 
On-sale Bar After Pfaff v. Wells Electronics: Toward a Bright-Line Rule, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 155 (1999). 
Oddly, although the Supreme Court supported agency-like rulemaking in the Federal Circuit 
during the 1990s, it also criticized the Federal Circuit for failing to grant proper deference to 
appeals from the PTO. In Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), the Supreme Court held that the 
APA applies to patent decisions from the PTO, and that the Federal Circuit must apply the 
appropriate standard of review under § 706 of the APA. Id. at 152. 
 124. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 56, 67 (1998). 
 125. Id. at 67. 
 126. Id. at 68. 
21
Kumer: The Accidental Agency?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
250 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
that narrows a claim to comply with any part of the Patent Act
127
 and that a 
flexible case-by-case approach was unworkable because it hinders 
predictability.
128
 The Supreme Court reversed. It held that although the 
inventor cannot use the doctrine to recapture what she gave up to get the 
claim through the PTO, she can apply the doctrine to the narrow claim that 
was issued.
129
 The Court recognized that although this approach would 
introduce uncertainty, this was “the price of ensuring the appropriate 
incentives for innovation.”130  
In the face of these inconsistencies, the Federal Circuit continued to 
create more bright-line rules. In Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit drew a line between declaratory judgment cases that satisfy the 
case-or-controversy requirement and those that do not.
131
 The court held 
that a patent licensee in compliance with its license could not establish an 
Article III case or controversy for a declaratory judgment action regarding 
patent validity, enforceability, or scope.
132
 
C.  The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Bright-Line Rule 
The Supreme Court’s attitude toward bright-line patent rules shifted in 
the mid-2000s with the changes in court membership. In the 2006 decision 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court found patent exceptionalism 
to be inappropriate, and rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule of granting 
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement.
133
 The Supreme Court 
held that district courts cannot grant an injunction unless the plaintiff 
demonstrates:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not 
be disserved by a permanent injunction.
134
  
                                                                                                                     
 127. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 568 (Fed. Cir. 
2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002). 
 128. Id. at 596. 
 129. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002). 
 130. Id. at 732. 
 131. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 132. Id.; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122, 137 (2007) 
(discussing, and ultimately reversing, the Gen-Probe decision); Liza Vertinsky, Reconsidering 
Patent Licensing in the Aftermath of MedImmune, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1609, 1615–16 (2009) 
(discussing the Federal Circuit’s bright-line “reasonable apprehension of suit” test). 
 133. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
 134. Id. at 391. 
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The Court stated that “[t]hese familiar principles apply with equal force to 
disputes arising under the Patent Act,” and maintained that the Patent Act 
did not evince an intent by Congress to depart from traditional equitable 
practice.
135
 
One year later, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme 
Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that a company that licenses a 
patent cannot establish “actual controversy” unless it breaches the license 
agreement.
136
 In dicta, the Court also rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
“reasonable apprehension of suit” test for justiciability of claims in 
declaratory judgment actions.
137
 Under this test, the Federal Circuit 
previously held that a declaratory plaintiff must have a reasonable 
apprehension of being imminently sued.
138
 The Supreme Court stated that 
the reasonable apprehension of suit test conflicted with earlier Court cases 
holding that apprehension of a suit was not necessary for bringing a 
declaratory judgment.
139
 
The same year, the Supreme Court struck down the Federal Circuit’s 
rule that the teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) test for obviousness 
was mandatory.
140
 With regard to the question of obviousness, the Court 
stated “our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach 
inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test.”141 
Although the Court recognized that it had advocated “uniformity and 
definiteness” in an earlier decision, it observed that it had also advocated 
examining “secondary considerations” where appropriate.142 The Court 
further noted that the Federal Circuit had taken a useful guiding principle 
from the CCPA too far.
143
 
In the 2008 decision In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit held that the 
machine-or-transformation test, first articulated by the court in 1998,
144
 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at 391–92. 
 136. MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 132. 
 137. Id. at 132 n.11. 
 138. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This rule is 
not based on CCPA precedent, but rather on precedent from the Third Circuit. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. 
Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (rejecting the Third Circuit’s approach to jurisdiction 
“that there can never be an apprehension of a federal infringement suit . . . when a license is still in 
effect” in favor of a more lenient approach that “a reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit” 
gives rise to jurisdiction). 
 139. MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 132 n.11. 
 140. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by rejecting the 
rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 415–16 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966)). 
 143. Id. at 418–19 (“But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that 
limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.”). 
 144. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a 
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was mandatory for determining the patent eligibility of a process under 
§ 101 of the Patent Act.
145
 The Supreme Court affirmed the invalidity of 
the patent at issue, but held that a nonabstract business method can be 
patentable even if it fails the test.
146
 The Court reiterated “that courts 
should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the 
legislature has not expressed,”147 making its strongest statement to date 
against judicial rulemaking. The Supreme Court also noted that, in 
recognizing limited exceptions to patentable subject matter, it had not 
given courts “carte blanche to impose other limitations that are 
inconsistent with the text and the statute’s purpose and design.”148 
Finally, in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services, the claim at issue involved a method that allowed doctors to 
measure metabolites in the blood to determine whether the patient’s dose 
of a particular drug was too high or low.
149
 The Federal Circuit observed 
that the Supreme Court “did not disavow the machine-or-transformation 
test” in Bilski.150 It held that the claim was patent-eligible under § 101 
because it related to the application of a natural phenomenon, and that the 
process of administering the drug to the patient and measuring the 
transformation in the blood satisfied the transformation prong of the 
machine-or-transformation test.
151
  
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit 9–0, observing that “to 
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application 
of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while 
adding the words ‘apply it.’”152 Although the Court emphasized that 
machine-or-transformation was not met in this case, it stressed that it had 
“neither said nor implied that the test trumps the ‘law of nature’ 
                                                                                                                     
machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical 
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces ‘a useful, 
concrete and tangible result’—a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting 
purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.”). 
 145. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court, however, has 
enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to 
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the 
principle itself. A claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or 
thing.”), aff’d on other grounds, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). 
 146. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27, 3231 (2010). 
 147. Id. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 148. Id. at 3226. 
 149. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 150. Id. at 1355. 
 151. Id. at 1355–56. 
 152. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
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exclusion.”153 
This series of Supreme Court decisions establish that the Federal 
Circuit’s rigid reliance on rules will no longer be tolerated. The Court has 
not expressed concern over the Federal Circuit’s creating tests to help 
clarify ambiguities in the Patent Act, but rather over its making such tests 
mandatory.
154
 This backlash against judicial rulemaking, however, raises 
an important question—whether the Federal Circuit’s actions were 
improper and what the Supreme Court’s motivation was for intervening. 
D.  Bright-Line Rules as Substantive Rules 
Scholars have discussed how the Federal Circuit’s use of bright-line 
rules provides certainty through the use of formalism,
155
 but adversely 
impacts innovation.
156
 From that perspective, the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of these rules may be viewed as a retreat from a particular type of 
formalism. For example, Professor Timothy Holbrook has argued that the 
Court has rejected substantive formalism in favor of process-based 
formalism.
157
 Additionally, Professor Arti Rai has suggested that the 
Court’s actions may be an attempt to promote more nuanced policy making 
in the Federal Circuit. Professor Rai points out that the Supreme Court has 
“emphasized the dynamic and evolving nature” of patent law,158 and that in 
Festo, it noted that “[f]undamental alterations” in established (flexible) 
rules “risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their 
property.”159 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 1303. 
 154. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). 
 155. See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 776 
(2003) (“Adjudicative rule formalism counsels that lawmakers should, where possible, stipulate 
bright-line rules instead of vague standards.”); Vertinsky, supra note 132, at 1620 (“Reliability and 
predictability of patent rights are critical to facilitating private party contracts and bright-line rules 
can be useful in enhancing predictability and strengthening property rights where managed 
appropriately to allow for changes in technological needs and possibilities.”). 
 156. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States 
Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and 
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917, 965 (2004) (“Despite the seeming attractiveness of precise 
rules, nuanced and flexible standards are generally more appropriate for the dynamic innovation 
environment confronted by the Federal Circuit.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2003) (noting 
that “bright-line rules cannot be expected to do a good job of furthering the innovation goals of 
patent law” and that “even if certain bright-line rules could incorporate innovation policy goals to 
some extent, the rules that the Federal Circuit has chosen do not appear to do so”). 
 157. Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 126–127, 129 (2005). 
 158. Rai, supra note 156, at 1119–20. 
 159. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002). 
25
Kumer: The Accidental Agency?
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
254 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
But scholars have only just begun to consider bright-line rules as a 
form of substantive rulemaking. From this perspective, the rejection of 
bright-line rules might be viewed as a response to the Federal Circuit 
assuming an agency-like role. Although the procedure for creating  bright-
line rules varies considerably from the notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process, the effects of both types of rules are essentially the same. 
1.  Overview of Substantive Rulemaking 
In administrative law, the distinction between substantive and non-
substantive rulemaking is important because only substantive rules carry 
the force of law,
160
 making them binding on both the agency and the 
public.
161
 The APA defines “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the 
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.”162 
According to the Federal Circuit, a substantive rule is broadly defined as 
“action that is legislative in nature, is primarily concerned with policy 
considerations for the future rather than the evaluation of past conduct, and 
looks not to the evidentiary facts but to policy-making conclusions to be 
drawn from the facts.”163  
An agency cannot pass substantive rules unless (1) the agency has been 
delegated authority to do so by Congress and (2) the agency follows proper 
procedure under the APA.
164
 The vast majority of substantive rules are 
passed through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process governed by 
§ 553 of the APA.
165
 This provision allows an agency to propose a rule,
166
 
and requires a commenting period for the public to provide input.
167
 The 
agency will then take this input into account in issuing a final version of 
the rule.
168
 The procedure provided by § 553 allows the public to provide 
meaningful commentary, thereby (in theory) safeguarding the community 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 254 (2001) (observing that interpretations 
such as opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines “lack the 
force of law” and “do not warrant Chevron-style deference”). 
 161. See Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 464 
F.3d 1306, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The change in existing law affected by a substantive rule is 
binding not only within the agency, but is also binding on tribunals outside the agency.”).  
 162. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006). 
 163. Coal. for Common Sense, 464 F.3d. at 1317 (quoting Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y 
of Veterans Affairs, 308 F.3d 1262, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 164. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 165. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).  
 166. Id. § 553(b).  
 167. Id. § 553(c).  
 168. Id. 
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against bad rules.
169
 
Non-substantive rules, such as interpretive rules and policy statements, 
are exempt from the notice-and-comment process.
170
 They do not have the 
force of law, and consequently, these statements do not bind the agency or 
the public.
171
 Policy statements merely communicate to the public how the 
agency plans to exercise a discretionary power,
172
 whereas interpretive 
rules tell the public how the agency interprets an existing statute or rule.
173
  
Professor Mark Seidenfeld and others have argued that agencies ought 
to be granted greater flexibility.
174
 As Professor Seidenfeld observes, the 
Supreme Court has held that agencies are free to make policy through 
rulemaking.
175
 Thus, an argument can be made that substantive rules need 
not be bright-line in nature. At the same time, the traditional dichotomy is 
that substantive rules tend to be rigid,
176
 whereas interpretive rules and 
policy statements allow for flexibility. 
2.  Federal Circuit Substantive Rulemaking 
Professor Ryan Vacca recently argued that when the Federal Circuit 
acts en banc, it functions like an agency engaging in substantive 
rulemaking.
177
 Professor Vacca claims that the Federal Circuit’s order for a 
rehearing en banc constitutes a de facto notice-and-comment process, 
                                                                                                                     
 169. See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the importance of agencies’ providing all pertinent data and information to the public, 
so that the public can provide “useful criticism” of the proposed rule (quoting Conn. Light & Power 
Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982))). 
 170. Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 632 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 171. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (discussing the distinction between substantive and non-substantive rules). 
 172. According to the Attorney General’s Manual on the APA, a “policy statement” is a 
statement “issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the 
agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947). 
 173. According to the Attorney General’s Manual on the APA, “interpretive rules” are “rules 
or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes 
and rules which it administers.” Id. 
 174. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 440–41 (1999). 
 175. Id. at 441 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947); NLRB v. Bell 
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974)). 
 176. Indeed, a common criticism of agency rulemaking is that it is an “‘ossified’ . . . 
decisionmaking process that is less flexible, less rational, and less effective” compared to 
adjudication. David B. Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory 
Reform: The Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 608 (2000) (quoting 
Jody Freedman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 3. 
(1997)). 
 177. Vacca, supra note 9, at 747–48. 
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because amici can submit briefs to the court for a set period of time.
178
  
But looking at the Federal Circuit cases discussed above, both panel 
and en banc rules are equivalent to substantive rulemaking. The rules were 
legislative-like, given that they were rigid and mandatory. They were also 
forward-looking tests meant to bind lower courts, the PTO, and the public 
at large. Although Professor Vacca is correct that only en banc decisions 
offer any opportunity for public participation,
179
 rules issued through panel 
decisions also bind parties like substantive rules.  
There are several reasons to be uneasy with the Federal Circuit’s 
bright-line substantive rulemaking. The Federal Circuit is an Article III 
court whose judges are appointed for life.
180
 Consequently, if the public is 
dissatisfied with any rule that the Federal Circuit enacts, there is no 
mechanism by which to replace the judges. The PTO, by contrast, is part of 
the Department of Commerce. The President can hold the Director of the 
PTO accountable for bad choices, and the public can ultimately hold the 
President accountable. 
Bright-line rulemaking, moreover, permits very limited public input. 
Members of the public can file amicus briefs in an attempt to sway the 
Federal Circuit on a particular decision.
181
 And in at least one case, the 
Federal Circuit appears to have reversed a decision because of public 
backlash.
182
 Such public participation is substantially less effective than 
public input during agency rulemaking. With judicial rulemaking, the 
public never knows which appeal will give rise to a bright-line rule. 
Moreover, filing an amicus brief is a more onerous task than filing a 
comment regarding a proposed rule on a government website.  
Agencies, however, are subject to rigid procedural requirements when 
engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
183
 They are required to 
provide all relevant information and data to the public to ensure the 
public’s full participation.184 Unlike amicus briefs, which a court can 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Id. at 748. 
 179. Id. at 748–49. 
 180. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); S. REP. NO. 97-
275, at 2–3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11–12 (“Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit—The bill creates an article III court that is similar in structure to the eleven other courts of 
appeals.”). 
 181. See Vacca, supra note 9, at 743–44. 
 182. See Kumar, supra note 2, at 1607–08 (discussing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 
285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002), vacated, 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 183. See 5 U.S.C § 553 (2006) (establishing procedural requirements for rulemaking); Merrill, 
supra note 31, at 2155 (observing that modern administrative rulemaking is subject to rigid 
procedural requirements in contrast to legislative statutemaking). 
 184. The Third Circuit recently noted that to ensure the public has been “fairly apprised of a 
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ignore, an agency “must respond in a reasoned manner to the comments 
received,” both “to explain how the agency resolved any significant 
problems raised by the comments, and to show how that resolution led the 
agency to the ultimate rule.”185  
Agencies also have access to greater amounts of information than 
appellate courts do.
186
 In issuing a bright-line rule, the Federal Circuit may 
only rely upon the briefs submitted by the parties.
187
 In contrast, agencies 
can consider numerous sources of information, such as studies and 
information from hearings.
188
 
But is the Federal Circuit at fault for using bright-line rules? By virtue 
of failing to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking authority over the major 
provisions of the Patent Act, Congress implicitly delegated interpretive 
authority to the courts. In creating a semi-specialized court, Congress 
further concentrated power in the Federal Circuit, allowing the expert court 
to serve as a one-stop shop for clarification of the Patent Act. 
Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s rulemaking does not appear to exceed 
the authority granted to the court by Congress, although it may fail to 
promote good policy. Indeed, an argument can be made that the Federal 
Circuit has been put in an untenable situation, being charged with unifying 
administrative law, yet being required to be deferential to agencies under 
the APA.  
III.  FEDERAL CIRCUIT ADJUDICATION 
The PTO has historically been a weak agency. Though § 2(a)(1) of the 
Patent Act states that the PTO “shall be responsible for the granting and 
issuing of patents,”189 it fails to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking 
authority over the provisions of the Patent Act that govern patentability 
                                                                                                                     
new rule,” the court must ask “‘whether the purposes of notice and comment have been adequately 
served.’” Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Water 
Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). To achieve “an exchange of views, 
information, and criticism” between the public and the agency, the agency “must disclose in detail 
the thinking that has animated the form of a proposed rule and the data upon which that rule is 
based” and it “has an obligation to make its views known to the public in a concrete and focused 
form so as to make criticism or formulation of alternatives possible.” Id. (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 185. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. EPA, 941 F.2d 1339, 1359 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Action 
on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 186. Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2004). 
 187. See id.  
 188. Id. 
 189. 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2006). 
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requirements and infringement.
190
 Instead, the agency is limited to creating 
procedures for implementing the statute.
191
 
Whatever mistrust Congress had of the PTO in 1952 could have 
subsided over time. With proper funding and guidance, the PTO could 
have developed policymaking skills that would have allowed it to 
successfully administer the statute. But the Federal Circuit picked up where 
the framers of the Patent Act and the CCPA left off, continuing to weaken 
and discredit the agency.  
The Federal Circuit consistently misconstrues the APA and Supreme 
Court precedent interpreting the APA with regard to patent cases. Among 
the courts of appeal, the Federal Circuit stands alone in its attempt to 
undermine administrative law. Admittedly, the court does generally 
comply with the APA in reviewing non-patent agency decisions. But for 
patent cases from the PTO and ITC, the court’s review resembles the non-
deferential approach taken by the top level of an agency reviewing an 
administrative law judge more than a federal court reviewing an executive 
branch agency.
192
 This is particularly interesting given that the Federal 
Circuit’s review of non-patent agencies appears to be quite deferential.193 
                                                                                                                     
 190. See Tran, supra note 3, at 603. 
 191. Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 501, 535 (2010).  
 192. There is one notable exception: so-called Auer deference. The Supreme Court held that an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is granted controlling weight unless it is “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In a recent opinion authored by Judge Timothy Dyk, the Federal Circuit 
granted Auer deference to the PTO’s interpretation of one of its regulations, despite the fact that the 
Federal Circuit had previously interpreted the same regulation differently. In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 
1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (applying the “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” 
standard). In doing so, the court applied a Chevron-related Supreme Court case that “held that a 
judicial interpretation would trump an agency’s construction only if the judicial precedent 
‘unambiguously foreclose[d] the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contain[ed] no gap for the 
agency to fill.’” Id. at 1354 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)). The Federal Circuit could have attempted to 
distinguish between Chevron and Auer deference, but it instead appropriately deferred to the PTO. 
 193. For example, the Federal Circuit has been willing to apply Chevron and Skidmore 
deference to non-patent agencies. See Keener v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (granting Chevron deference to the Treasury regulation interpreting I.R.C. § 7422); Patterson 
v. Dep’t of the Interior, 424 F.3d 1151, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (granting Chevron deference to the 
Office of Personnel Management); Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (granting Chevron deference to the Merit Systems Protection Board’s interpretation of 5 
U.S.C. § 7521); Brownlee v. Dyncorp, 349 F.3d 1343, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (granting Chevron 
deference to the Secretary of Defense’s interpretation of Federal Acquisition Regulation); 
Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 
1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even where [the Department of] Commerce has not engaged in notice-and-
comment rulemaking, its statutory interpretations articulated in the course of antidumping 
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Section A of this Part looks at the Federal Circuit’s attempts to 
disregard the judicial review provision of the APA with respect to the 
PTO. Section B discusses the Federal Circuit’s practice of construing 
questions of fact as those of law so it can review them de novo. Section C 
argues that the Federal Circuit has deliberately misinterpreted Supreme 
Court precedent so it can affirm PTO decisions on alternate grounds. 
Finally, Section D discusses how the Federal Circuit’s non-deferential 
treatment of patent agencies extends to the ITC. 
A.  Applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act 
While Congress debated the APA, patent attorneys and the Patent 
Office fought against additional control and oversight, but both were 
ultimately unsuccessful.
194
 For example, the American Bar Association’s 
Special Committee on Administrative Law
195
 issued a proposal in 1935, 
and again in 1936, that the jurisdictional functions of the Court of Claims, 
the Board of Tax Appeals, the Customs Court, and the CCPA be combined 
into a single administrative court.
196
 A representative for the Patent and 
Trademark Section of the American Bar Association testified against the 
proposal and expressly asked that patents be “let alone.”.197  
The 1939 Walter–Logan bill was a rigid predecessor to the APA that 
attempted to dramatically formalize agency process.
198
 The bill contained 
an explicit exception for the Patent Office, likely because it was 
established in 1836—well before the New Deal.199 President Franklin 
Roosevelt vetoed that bill in 1940.
200
  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
proceedings draw Chevron deference.” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 
(2001))); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (granting Chevron deference to the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board’s 
interpretation of Lanham Act). In contrast, the court has not granted the PTO Skidmore deference 
for its interpretations of the Patent Act and has been reluctant to grant Chevron deference to ITC 
patent decisions. 
 194. The Patent Office was renamed the Patent and Trademark Office in 1975. Pub. L. 93-596, 
Sec. 1, 88 Stat. 1949 (Jan. 2, 1975). 
 195. The ABA’s Special Committee was established in 1933 in response to the bar’s concern 
with the growing administrative state. See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1569–70 (noting that “[t]he 
committee professed to take no position on the desirability of the New Deal” but that their 1933 
report “expressed indirectly the organized bar's opposition to the New Deal.”) 
 196. Id. at 1575. 
 197. 1936 A.B.A. Ann. Rep. 234 (statement of Thomas E. Robertson). 
 198. PETER WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE INFORMAL PROCESS 19 (1963). 
 199. Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1618–19 tbl.1. 
 200. Presidential Veto Message, Walter-Logan Bill, reprinted in 86 Cong. Rec. 13943 (1940) 
(“Today in sustaining American ideals of justice, an ounce of action is worth more than a pound of 
argument. For these reasons I return the bill without my approval. Franklin D. Roosevelt.”). 
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In 1941, The Senate Judiciary Committee considered three bills 
addressing administrative procedural reform.
201
 The Patent Office was the 
sole agency to seek an exemption from the bills,
202
 which failed to pass.
203
 
As Professor George Shepherd notes, with the exception of the Patent 
Office, “[i]t appears that agencies understood—and that the Roosevelt 
administration had made clear to them—that some form of procedural 
reform was inevitable.”204 The remaining agencies “now sought to shape 
[the APA] and soften it.”205 
An early version of the McCarran–Sumners bill, which was drafted in 
1943, excluded patent cases from the judicial review chapter;
206
 however, 
Congress struck that exemption. When the McCarran–Sumners bill passed 
as the Administrative Procedure Act, it contained no individual agency 
exceptions.
207
 
The Federal Circuit, like the CCPA before it, refused to recognize that 
the APA had altered the judicial review standard for PTO decisions.
208
 
Although the CCPA never explicitly held that the APA was inapplicable to 
appeals from the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), 
it neither applied the statute nor acknowledged the possibility of its 
applicability.
209
 In 1997, the court stated: “The APA’s more deferential 
standards of review have never been applicable to the Board’s decisions 
and we are not persuaded to change this practice.”210 The court observed 
that it could not change its standard without the full court’s review.211  
The opportunity for en banc review of the Federal Circuit’s practice 
came in the 1998 decision In re Zurko.
212
 The unanimous court 
acknowledged that the Patent Commissioner had “campaigned 
                                                                                                                     
 201. Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1638. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1638, 1641. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. at 1649 (discussing the introduction of the McCarran-Sumners bill); (92 Cong. 
Rec. 2162 (1946) (statement of Allen Moore) (discussing how the bill contained exceptions for the 
Bureau of the Internal Revenue and Patent Office). 
 207. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (exempting no 
agencies from the provisions of the statute); In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(noting the Commissioner’s argument that the final version of the APA contained no explicit 
exception for the Patent Office), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999). 
 208. See, e.g., In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1574–78 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that history 
does not support applying the APA’s more deferential standards of review to findings of fact).  
 209. See, e.g., In re Kunzmann, 326 F.2d 424, 426 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (upholding the examiner’s 
findings because the appellant “failed to demonstrate that the examiner’s finding in this regard was 
clearly erroneous”). 
 210. Lueders, 111 F.3d at 1575. 
 211. Id. at 1574. 
 212. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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aggressively” for the court to review the BPAI’s factual findings under the 
substantial evidence standard from § 706 of the APA.
213
 The court 
nevertheless held that the less deferential “clearly erroneous” standard was 
appropriate for reviewing issues of patent validity appealed from the 
BPAI.
214
   
The Federal Circuit relied on § 559 of the APA to support the position 
that the Patent Office was exempt from § 706.
215
 Section 559 states that the 
judicial review provisions in the APA “do not limit or repeal additional 
requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.”216 The 
Federal Circuit interpreted this provision to preserve standards of judicial 
review that “evolved as a matter of common law, rather than compelling 
that all such standards of review be displaced” by the APA.217  
Even if this interpretation of § 559 is correct, the court’s attempt to 
circumvent § 706 was, at best, creative. The court first pointed to 
legislative history for early drafts of the APA that Congress did not enact. 
For example, the Federal Circuit observed that the failed Walter–Logan 
Bill exempted the Patent Office from the APA.
218
 It likewise noted the 
Senate Judiciary Committee’s statement that the McCarran–Sumners 
bill created an exemption for “matters subject to a subsequent trial  of 
the law and the facts de novo in any court,” such as “the work of the 
Patent Office.”219 This language, however, referred to the early version 
of the bill that contained an explicit exception;
220
 no such language 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Id. at 1449. 
 214. Id. at 1459. 
 215. Id. at 1452 (“This history suggests that Congress drafted the APA to apply to agencies 
generally, but that because of existing common law standards and the availability of trial de novo 
pursuant to section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, the predecessor of 35 U.S.C. § 145, Congress did 
not intend the APA to alter the review of substantive Patent Office decisions.”).  
Note that the legislative history that the Federal Circuit used to support the Zurko decision 
speaks equally to the Customs Service. As with the Patent Office, the creation of the Customs 
Service long precedes the New Deal and has a history of operating without direct judicial oversight. 
Both agencies provide opportunities for an appeal from an agency decision to a trial court for de 
novo review. But in 1981, the CCPA cited to the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and held that past CCPA precedent was “no 
longer controlling in view of the Administrative Procedure Act which authorizes judicial review to 
determine whether agency action, findings, and conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise 
not in accordance with the law.” Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1214, 1217 n.7.5 
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (citation omitted), overruling Waterman S.S. Corp. v. United States, 30 C.C.P.A. 
119 (1942). Given that the CCPA directly reviewed Customs Service decisions, one would have 
expected this decision to be relevant precedent for the Federal Circuit in determining how to review 
BPAI decisions. 
 216. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2006). 
 217. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452. 
 218. Id. at 1451. 
 219. Id. at 1451 (quoting 92 Cong. Rec. 2162 (1946)). 
 220. 92 Cong. Rec. 2162 (1946). 
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appeared in the final version of the bill that passed.
221
  
The court then claimed that the reason such language did not appear in 
the final bill was “likely that Congress viewed an explicit exception for the 
Patent Office as redundant in light of the ‘otherwise recognized by law’ 
exception” under § 559.222 The court disregarded the fact that most 
agencies quit seeking exemptions not because of statutory redundancy, but 
because procedural reform was inevitable.
223
  
The Federal Circuit also supported its position based on the history of 
the Patent Act, which set no standard of review.
224
 The court observed that 
the CCPA never applied § 706 judicial review standards in reviewing the 
PTO.
225
 Although it conceded that no single common law standard of 
review existed for PTO decisions, the court held that this lack of 
consistency established an additional requirement recognized by law.
226
 It 
furthermore made a stare decisis argument based on the fact that the CCPA 
had never applied standards from § 706, even though the CCPA had failed 
to consistently apply any other standard.
227
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit.
228
 The 
Court noted that “[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full 
of variation and diversity” and that “[i]t would frustrate that purpose to 
permit divergence on the basis of a requirement ‘recognized’ only as 
ambiguous.”229 It observed that the CCPA failed to apply a consistent 
judicial review standard, and found that the CCPA’s failure to apply the 
APA was not dispositive.
230
  
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Anthony M. 
Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the APA raised 
the minimum standard of review for agencies and that courts could 
establish more searching standards.
231
 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued:  
In making this determination, I would defer, not to agencies in 
general as the Court does today, but to the Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                     
 221. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (making no 
reference to “patent”). 
 222. Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1452. 
 223. See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 1638 (noting that agencies came to realize “that some 
form of procedural reform was inevitable” and that their best option was to “shape it and soften 
it.”). 
 224. See Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1453–57 (examining the history of the Patent Act). 
 225. Id. at 1455 (“Following Congress’ enactment of the APA, the CCPA continued to review 
Patent Office decisions as it had done before, without a clearly articulated standard of review.”). 
 226. Id. at 1454, 1459 (recognizing “the clear error standard” as an additional requirement). 
 227. See id. at 1454, 1457–58. 
 228. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999). 
 229. Id. at 155. 
 230. See id.  
 231. Id. at 170–71 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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for the Federal Circuit, the specialized Article III court 
charged with review of patent appeals. In this case the 
unanimous en banc Federal Circuit and the patent bar both 
agree that these cases recognized the “clearly erroneous” 
standard as an “additional requirement” placed on the PTO 
beyond the APA’s minimum procedures. I see no reason to 
reject their sensible and plausible resolution of the issue.
232
 
In taking this approach, the dissent treated the Federal Circuit as the 
administrator of the Patent Act, and acted as though the issue of deference 
turned solely on expertise. The Federal Circuit’s application of the Chenery 
doctrine, discussed below, further illustrates the fallacy of viewing 
deference solely as an issue of expertise.
233
 
Even after the Supreme Court’s intervention, the Federal Circuit 
continued to minimize deference to the PTO. Courts are supposed to 
review questions of fact from informal proceedings under the highly 
deferential arbitrary and capricious review standard.
234
 In contrast, courts 
review questions of fact from formal adjudication or rulemaking under the 
slightly less deferential substantial evidence standard, focusing on the 
formal record.
235
  
PTO proceedings are informal in that they do not comply with §§ 556 
and 557 of the APA.
236
 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit announced that 
the substantial evidence standard was appropriate, despite the lack of 
formal process.
237
 The reasoning for the court’s decision hinged on the 
language of § 706(2)(E) of the APA, which states that a reviewing court 
should set aside agency actions that are “unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”238 
The Federal Circuit focused on the second part of the phrase. The court 
maintained that § 144 of the Patent Act states that the court “shall review 
the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent 
                                                                                                                     
 232. Id. at 171. 
 233. See infra Section III.C. 
 234. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); see also Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power Over Fact-Finding 
in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 916 (2004) (“Substantial evidence review, 
which focuses on evidence within the four corners of the agency record, applies to formal agency 
proceedings; arbitrary and capricious review applies to informal proceedings.”) (citations omitted). 
 235. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006); see also Rai, supra note 234. 
 236. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1314, 1315 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Rai, supra note 234, 
at 916 (noting that PTO proceedings are informal). 
 237. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313. 
 238. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006). 
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and Trademark Office,”239 and that the substantial evidence standard was 
therefore appropriate.
240
 In drawing this distinction, the court claimed that 
substantial evidence is much less deferential than arbitrary and capricious 
review.
241
  
Yet the Supreme Court in Zurko disagreed with this claim, citing to a 
D.C. Circuit case with a parenthetical explaining that there is “no 
difference” between the two standards “as applied to court review of 
agency factfinding.”242 This perceived lack of distinction may be the reason 
why the Court declined to decide which standard applied.
243
 
B.  The Manipulation of Questions of Law and Fact 
The level of deference that an agency receives for its decisions turns on 
whether the question the agency considered was one of law or fact. Courts 
review questions of law de novo, granting no deference to the agency.
244
 In 
contrast, as noted above, courts review questions of fact deferentially, and 
affirm a high percentage of such agency decisions.
245
  
The Supreme Court has recognized that the nature of the distinction 
between law and fact is “vexing,”246 and that “the appropriate methodology 
for distinguishing” such questions “has been, to say the least, elusive.”247 
Professor Craig Nard observed that law and fact often overlap, resulting in 
a third category of mixed questions of law and fact.
248
 Even more 
problematic than blurred dividing lines is the fact that courts can exploit 
the distinction to reduce deference to agencies. 
                                                                                                                     
 239. 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2006). 
 240. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1313. 
 241. Id. at 1312. 
 242. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 158 (1999) (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. 
Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 243. See Rai, supra note 234, at 917 (noting that “[t]he Court probably did not contemplate the 
liberties that the Federal Circuit would take with the legal gap left open by the Zurko decision” and 
observing that Justice Stephen Breyer indicated during oral argument that arbitrary and capricious 
review might be most appropriate). 
 244. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 615–16 
(2007) (“Article III presumptively demands that the reviewing courts be able to exercise de novo 
judgment about questions of law and about factual disputes on which constitutional rights turn, but 
Congress usually can require courts to give great weight to the agencies’ other factual 
determinations.”). 
 245. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 53 (2007) 
(finding that courts of appeals affirm agency decisions in 75% of cases under arbitrary and 
capricious review and in 70% of cases under substantial evidence review). Note, however, that this 
study looks at all courts of appeal and not just the Federal Circuit.  
 246. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). 
 247. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985). 
 248. Nard, supra note 84, at 1424 (“[L]aw and fact often overlap, forming a third category 
called mixed questions of law and fact or law application to fact.”). 
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Professor Arti Rai and others observe that the Federal Circuit exploits 
the distinction between law and fact to minimize deference to the PTO.
249
 
Facts are central to patent law issues such as infringement, claim scope, 
and validity.
250
 Questions of fact in informal proceedings, like those in the 
PTO, should be affirmed unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an 
abuse of discretion.”251 Yet the Federal Circuit engages in what Professor 
Rai refers to as “alchemy”—turning facts into law252 by construing 
questions that involve mixed issues of law and fact, such as claim 
construction, as “pure questions of law.”253 The court then reviews the 
agency decision de novo instead of granting proper deference to PTO fact-
finding. 
One might argue that the Federal Circuit should review fact-finding de 
novo, given its comparative expertise. But of the ten active judges currently 
on the bench, only three appear to possess technical degrees: Judges 
Newman (Ph.D. Chemistry),
254
 Lourie (Ph.D. Chemistry),
255
 and Moore 
(B.S.E.E., M.S. ).
256
 This still leaves large gaps in scientific knowledge, 
such as computer science, biology, and physics.
257
 In contrast, all PTO 
examiners possess at least a technical undergraduate degree,
258
 and 
administrative law judges on the BPAI additionally possess a J.D. and 
“comprehensive patent experience” in a desired technical area.259 
                                                                                                                     
 249. Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 877, 883 (2002) (discussing “the Federal Circuit’s [a]lchemy” of turning questions of 
fact into questions of law); see also Thomas O. Sargentich, The Supreme Court’s Administrative 
Law Jurisprudence, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 273, 284 (1993) (observing that “the line between law 
and policy is highly manipulable” and that “[m]atters can be seen as questions of law when we want 
them to be decided by courts, and they often can be seen as issues of policy when we want 
deference to agencies”). 
 250. Rai, supra note 249, at 881. 
 251. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
 252. Rai, supra note 249.  
 253. Id. 
 254. Biography of Pauline Newman, IP HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES, http://www.iphand 
book.org/handbook/authors/A132/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
 255. See supra note 108. 
 256. See Biography of Kimberly A. Moore, supra note 106.  
 257. See Rai, supra note 249, at 888 (noting that only a few Federal Circuit judges have 
technical training and that there are gaps in their expertise). 
 258. See Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (stating that the minimum qualification for 
an entry-level GS-5 position is the completion of all requirements for a bachelor’s degree in 
engineering, chemistry, microbiology, physics, biology, or design; several fields also require a 
minimum number of hours of coursework in the major). 
 259. See, e.g., Job Listing for Administrative Patent Judge, USAJOBS, http://www.usa 
jobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/306360900 (follow “viewed” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); 
see also 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2006) (“The administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent 
legal knowledge and scientific ability . . . .”). 
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Part of the problem is that whether a patent issue is a question of law or 
fact impacts review of both agency and trial court decisions. Given that 
trial court judges generally do not have patent expertise, some might prefer 
that the Federal Circuit aggressively construe issues as questions of law, in 
order to trigger de novo review.
260
  
But even if the Federal Circuit is motivated by limiting the power of 
unskilled trial court judges, it is also taking power away from the executive 
branch. Consider, for example, the issue of claim construction. In the 
Supreme Court’s Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. decision, the 
Court held that claim construction is an issue for the judge.
261
 In dicta, 
however, the Court noted that claim construction is a “mongrel 
practice.”262 It further noted, pragmatically, that for an issue that “falls 
somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, 
the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a 
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better 
positioned than another to decide the issue in question.”263 Here, the Court 
noted, judges “are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent 
terms” than juries,264 and argued that this would promote uniformity in 
patent law.
265
 
Many scholars have argued that the Supreme Court’s decision supports 
the idea that claim construction is a mixed question of law and fact,
266
 
which leads to the observation that judges should receive deference for 
such decisions.
267
 Nevertheless, in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 
the en banc Federal Circuit held that “claim construction is purely a matter 
of law,” and is subject to de novo review.268 
                                                                                                                     
 260. Note, however, that even a nonexpert district court judge will have the benefit of having 
heard testimony firsthand, rather than reviewing a cold record. Therein lies a fundamental problem 
with the patent litigation system—the failure to employ specialized trial courts. Congress could 
have achieved uniformity in the patent system by coupling special trial court judges modeled after 
the bankruptcy system with a strong patent agency with full rulemaking authority. 
 261. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376, 391 (1996). 
 262. Id. at 378. 
 263. Id. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. at 390–91. 
 266. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal 
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 824–25 (2008) (describing claim construction 
as a mixed question of law and fact); Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim 
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 674 (2004) 
(arguing that under Markman, the Supreme Court deemed claim construction to be “a mixed 
question of law and fact”). 
 267. See Rai, supra note 249, at 887 (discussing why de novo review of fact-laden decisions 
harms uniformity). 
 268. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs. Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The issue of 
whether claim construction should be viewed as a question of whether district courts should be 
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A direct consequence of the Cybor decision is that ITC claim 
construction is reviewed de novo, notwithstanding the fact that there is no 
jury in ITC proceedings, nor are there Markman hearings. Consequently, 
the Federal Circuit’s decision to make claim construction a pure question 
of law not only took power away from the district courts, but also from the 
executive branch. 
By construing mixed questions as those of pure law, the Federal Circuit 
acts more like the top level of an agency than an Article III court. 
Commissioners that head agencies often have wide discretion to reverse 
decisions made by administrative law judges. For example, Commissioners 
of the ITC can reverse an ALJ’s decision on any ground, without 
deference.
269
 The Federal Circuit appears to want this level of discretion 
for itself, without the limitations of an agency. 
C.  The Chenery Doctrine 
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court decided two cases, known as Chenery 
I and Chenery II, which set a new standard for courts that affirm agency 
decisions.
270
 Although the cases are now quite old, their holding that courts 
cannot substitute their own judgment when affirming an agency is still 
good law. Patent scholars have paid scant attention to the doctrine,
271
 
notwithstanding a recent case in which the Federal Circuit circumvented 
the decisions to minimize deference to the PTO.
272
 
                                                                                                                     
entitled to deference for claim constructions remains divisive. In Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickinson and Co., the court reiterated that claim construction is to be reviewed de novo. 
653 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011). A petition for hearing en banc was denied, but Judge Moore, 
joined by Judge Rader, dissented, stating: “It is time to rethink the deference we give to district 
court claim constructions and the fallacy that the entire process is one of law.” 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 
(Moore, J. dissenting). Judge O’Malley maintained that “[i]t is time to revisit and reverse our 
decision in Cybor Corp.” Id. at 1373 (O’Malley, J. dissenting). 
 269. 19 C.F.R. § 210.45(c) (2012) (stating that “the Commission may affirm, reverse, modify, 
set aside or remand” an ALJ’s initial determination “for further proceedings”). 
  A similar dynamic exists for many Article I courts. For example, although special trial 
judges of the Tax Court “perform more than ministerial tasks,” “they lack authority to [issue] final 
decision[s].” Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991). An open question remains as to 
why Congress granted the CCPA (and subsequently, the Federal Circuit) Article III status. 
 270. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) [hereinafter Chenery II]; SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) [hereinafter Chenery I]. 
 271. The only scholarly discussion of the Chenery doctrine in relation to patent law prior to 
this Article is in an amicus brief that was filed in Dickinson v. Zurko and was later republished. See 
Thomas G. Field, Jr. et al., Dickinson v. Zurko: An Amicus Brief, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
49, 57–61 (2000) (observing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Zurko violates the Chenery 
doctrine). Subsequently, Amy Motomura has written about the Federal Circuit’s misapplication of 
the Chenery decisions. See Amy Motomura, Rethinking the Chenery Doctrine (draft on file with 
author). 
 272. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973–75 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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1.  The Chenery Decisions 
When an appellate court reviews a district court decision, the appellate 
court is permitted to affirm the decision on grounds other than what the 
district court considered.
273
 The district court’s basis for its decision is not 
dispositive. Judicial review of agency adjudication, however, is far more 
restricted. In the Supreme Court’s 1943 decision SEC v. Chenery (Chenery 
I), the SEC considered whether a corporation’s management owes a 
fiduciary duty to all of its affected securities holders.
274
 The SEC 
determined that although “the management does not hold stock . . . in trust 
for the stockholders,” it owes them a “duty of fair dealing.”275  
In reviewing the SEC’s actions, the Supreme Court drew a sharp 
distinction between reviewing district court decisions and reviewing 
agency decisions. The Court held that “in reviewing the decision of a lower 
court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct ‘although the lower court 
relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.’”276 The Court 
explained: 
The reason for this rule is obvious. It would be wasteful to 
send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which 
it had already made but which the appellate court concluded 
should properly be based on another ground within the power 
of the appellate court to formulate.
277
 
Thus, appellate courts may affirm district courts on a different basis than 
what the district court used for reasons of judicial economy. 
In contrast, the Supreme Court did not find that judicial economy was a 
driving force in appellate review of agency adjudication. The Court 
observed that for such decisions, review is more analogous to that of jury 
decisions, and noted: “The grounds upon which an administrative order 
must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action 
was based.”278 It then articulated what scholars have characterized as a 
“fundamental principle of administrative law”:279 
                                                                                                                     
 273. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88 (“[W]e do not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the 
decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct ‘although the lower court relied 
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.’”) (quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 
(1937)). 
 274. Id. at 87. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 88 (quoting Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)). 
 277. Id. at 88. 
 278. Id. at 87. 
 279. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 
1032, 1042 (2011). 
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If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or 
judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and 
which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to 
do service for an administrative judgment. For purposes of 
affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court 
cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has 
exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.
280
 
Four years later, in a case also called S.E.C. v. Chenery (Chenery II), 
the Court reiterated that in judging a decision that the “administrative 
agency alone is authorized to make,” the court “must judge the propriety of 
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”281 Thus, the 
reviewing court is constrained because it cannot take power away from the 
agency. Only the agency has the power to select the basis for its decision. 
This holding has been reaffirmed in more recent Supreme Court 
decisions,
282
 and has been applied to agency decisions that arise from 
informal adjudication.
283
 
2.  The Federal Circuit’s Application of Chenery 
In the past, the Federal Circuit occasionally heeded the Chenery 
decisions. For example, the In re Thrift court found that the BPAI did not 
provide an adequate basis for rejecting a claim.
284
 The court then vacated 
and remanded the decision back to the BPAI.
285
 Although the agency 
provided additional reasons for its rejection of the claim at trial, the court 
maintained that under the Chenery decisions, a ground that does not appear 
in the BPAI’s decision could not be the basis for affirmance.286 
Likewise, in the Veterans Appeals case Mayfield v. Nicholson, the 
court found that the agency’s decision could not be affirmed on other 
                                                                                                                     
 280. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Court noted a few years later 
that to do otherwise “would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside 
exclusively for the administrative agency.” Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196. 
 281. 332 U.S. at 196. 
 282. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (applying Chenery I, and noting that 
appellate courts are “not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being 
reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry,” but rather, should “remand to 
the agency for additional investigation or explanation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (“It is 
well-established that an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the 
agency itself.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 139, 143 (1973) (applying the Chenery doctrine to 
informal adjudication). 
 284. In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1366–67. 
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grounds, even though most of the facts were undisputed.
287
 The 
government argued that the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 
applied the relevant statute and regulation to the undisputed facts of the 
case, and therefore “did not make a determination or judgment which an 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make.”288 The court disagreed, 
noting that the absence of a factual dispute did not reduce the agency’s 
analysis to “a mechanical comparison” of the statute, the regulation, and 
the disability letter at issue.
289
 An agency’s decision instead “turns on what 
inferences the agency draws from the facts before it.”290 In other words, the 
issue was not a pure question of law, even though it had undisputed facts. 
In 2009, however, the Federal Circuit changed its approach. In the In re 
Comiskey decision, the BPAI affirmed the patent examiner’s finding that a 
method was unpatentable under § 103 of the Patent Act.
291
 On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the BPAI, but on the basis that § 101 was not 
met.
292
  
The Federal Circuit stated that “the Supreme Court made clear that a 
reviewing court can (and should) affirm an agency decision on a legal 
ground not relied on by the agency, if there is no issue of fact, policy, or 
agency expertise.”293 The Federal Circuit supported this assertion with a 
statement by the Supreme Court that a review of a district court decision 
should not be remanded when the appellate court would affirm on a 
different basis.
294
 The Federal Circuit omitted the fact that the Supreme 
Court was making a distinction between the review of district court 
decisions and the review of agency decisions; it furthermore disregarded 
the comparison of agency adjudication to jury verdicts. 
The court also quoted the portion of Chenery I that states: “If an order 
is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency 
alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment 
cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.”295 The 
Federal Circuit concluded that when the agency decision at issue is a 
question of law, with no disputed underlying factual issues, the issue is a 
determination of neither policy nor judgment. The court asserted that in 
such circumstances, Chenery “not only permits [it] to supply a new legal 
ground for affirmance, but encourages such a resolution” where “[i]t would 
                                                                                                                     
 287. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 288. Id. at 1335 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 292. Id. at 969. For reasons unknown, Judge Paul Michel signed onto the opinions in both 
Mayfield and In re Comiskey. Id.; Mayfield, 444 F.3d at 1329. 
 293. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974. 
 294. Id. (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88). 
 295. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88). 
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be wasteful to send the case back to the agency for a determination as to 
patentable subject matter.”296 The court supported its position using only 
Federal Circuit cases. 
At no point, however, has the Supreme Court distinguished among 
questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, and pure questions of 
law in holding that agency decisions cannot be affirmed on alternative 
grounds. Indeed, the original decision involved a question of law;
297
 only 
later did other courts extend the original decision to fact-finding and 
statements of reason.
298
 
The little precedent that is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s position 
is based on faulty or inapplicable reasoning. The Fourth Circuit held that a 
case did not present a Chenery problem “because the question of 
interpretation of a federal statute is not ‘a determination or judgment which 
an administrative agency alone is authorized to make.’”299 The Fourth 
Circuit cited to a district court opinion that noted: “We are interpreting the 
scope of a federal statute and this task is not peculiar to an administrative 
agency.”300 In contrast, Congress has authorized the PTO to grant and 
reject patent applications. Although the PTO must interpret the Patent Act 
to determine whether to grant a patent, such interpretations relate to the 
task that Congress entrusted the PTO with. 
The Eighth Circuit has interpreted the Chenery decisions as limited to 
determinations of law.
301
 However, this decision, like In re Comiskey, 
reads the Supreme Court cases too narrowly. The Chenery decisions make 
clear that the doctrine is inapplicable only when a statute compels the 
agency’s action.302 But as the Mayfield decision illustrates, having a 
                                                                                                                     
 296. Id. at 975 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 88). 
 297. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 956 
(2007) (“The Chenery decision itself involved review of a formal adjudication, in which the SEC 
had relied upon erroneous legal principles to justify a decision that might have been sustained on 
other grounds.”); Amy R. Motomura, Rethinking the Chenery Doctrine, at 14 (draft on file with 
author) (observing that the Chenery decisions “involved a legal error by the SEC”). 
 298. Stack, supra note 297, at 956.  
 299. N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 725 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir. 
1984); see also Overseas Educ. Ass’n v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 827 F.2d 814, 818 n.1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (“It is absurd to suppose that [Chenery I] requires the Authority or a court adjudicating a 
question of law to order an agency to do that which the law forbids because the agency overlooked 
the point, and Chenery has never been put to so perverse a use.”).  
 300. N.C. Comm’n of Indian Affairs, 725 F.2d at 240 (citing Milk Transp., Inc. v. Interstate 
Commerce Comm’n, 190 F. Supp. 350, 355 (D. Minn. 1960), aff’d per curiam, 368 U.S. 5 (1961)); 
see also Motomura, supra note 297 at 12 (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s decision). 
 301. Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993). See also Motomura, 
supra note 297 at 13 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s decision). 
 302. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 95 F.3d 1094, 1099–1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(affirming a Department of Commerce antidumping proceeding where the only issue was one of 
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question of law does not automatically make this the case.
303
  
Likewise, the key issue in In re Comiskey was whether the BPAI was 
compelled to hold that the invention was not patentable under § 101 of the 
Patent Act or whether its decision turned on inferences drawn from the 
facts or on issues of policy. Section 101 sparsely states: “Whoever invents 
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”304 Neither § 101 nor its legislative history provides guidance for 
what constitutes a process, machine, manufacture, or the like.
305
 
As the Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Bilski v. Kappos 
illustrates, what constitutes patentable subject matter is far from a 
mechanical comparison of the claim at issue to § 101.
306
 It involves policy-
laden determinations of what types of inventions merit protection and the 
technical expertise to determine whether an invention is new and useful.
307
 
The PTO must make these policy determinations to do the job that was 
entrusted to it by Congress. It is thus unclear how the Federal Circuit can 
justify circumventing the Chenery decisions. 
 
                                                                                                                     
statutory construction, and the “plain language of the statute compel[led] the conclusion”); see also 
Stack, supra note 297, at 965–66 (discussing the limits of Chenery). 
 303. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text. 
 304. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 305. See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering 
Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1677 (2010) (“The literal terms 
of § 101—‘process, machine, manufacture and composition of matter’—are so open-ended that they 
provide very little traction for a court that feels the need to [rein] in the scope of patentable subject 
matter.”); Robert A. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical 
Algorithms: The Constitutional Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 57 
(1999) (“The legislative history regarding the meaning of the terms in § 101 provides no guidance 
in determining the meaning of those words as terms of art.”). 
 306. Sapna Kumar, The Bilski Decision: What Does it Mean for the Future of Business 
Method and Software Patents?, COMP. L. REV. INT. (August 15, 2010). 
 307. The Supreme Court had initially shied away from weighing in too heavily on policy issues 
surrounding patentable subject matter. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Court 
explicitly noted that policy concerns regarding safety were best left to the legislative process. Id. at 
317 (“The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the 
legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can 
provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and interests, 
which in our democratic system is the business of elected representatives.”). But in Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), the Supreme Court directly confronted the policy debate on how to 
promote innovation through defining what constitutes patentable subject matter. Compare id. at 
3227 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (arguing that, although patents were initially not given out for 
inventions that fail the machine-or-transformation test, “times change” and “[t]echnology and other 
innovations progress in unexpected ways”), with id. at 3254 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that business method patents do not promote innovation). 
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The In re Comiskey decision has arguably allowed the Federal Circuit 
to maintain uniformity in patent law. It allows the court to clarify to the 
public what the court believes are inadequacies in the claimed invention, 
rather than letting the PTO have the final word. This is more efficient than 
repeatedly remanding decisions back to the PTO until the agency agrees 
with the court’s reasoning. 
But there are numerous problems with the Federal Circuit’s heavy-
handed review of PTO rejections. As Judge Laurence Silberman of the 
D.C. Circuit has noted, the idea that the judicial branch cannot intrude 
upon the domain that Congress has entrusted to the agency stems “from 
proper respect for the separation of powers among the branches of 
government.”308 When Congress entrusts adjudicative power to an 
administrative agency, it entrusts it to the executive branch. Consequently, 
when the Federal Circuit substitutes its own judgment for that of the PTO, 
it takes for itself power that Congress properly delegated to the executive 
branch and thereby violates separation of powers.  
Such usurpation of executive branch discretion is troubling from an 
institutional-design perspective. As an executive branch entity, the PTO is 
politically accountable.
309
 Consequently, if the PTO adopted a policy 
contrary to that of the current administration, the Director could face 
removal by the President. If the public is displeased with the PTO’s 
actions, the public has the opportunity to vote the current President out of 
office. Furthermore, Congress can exert oversight by controlling the PTO’s 
budget, subjecting PTO officials to hearings, and refusing to confirm the 
President’s choice for Director.310  
                                                                                                                     
 308. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Silberman, J., 
concurring); see also Bhattarai v. Holder, 408 Fed. App’x 212, 221 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Chenery’s 
rule thus secures the separation of powers among the three branches.”); Richard E. Levy & Robert 
L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 504 (2011) (“In SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., for example, the Court drew on separation of powers concepts to conclude that agency 
decisions must stand or fall on the basis of the reasons given by the agency and that courts cannot 
uphold the agency decision on other grounds.”); Joshua I. Schwartz, Administrative Law Lessons 
Regarding the Role of Politically Appointed Officials in Default Terminations, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 
143, 205 (2001) (“The Chenery rule rests ultimately on considerations of separation of powers.”). 
 309. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron 
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1524 (observing 
that agencies should make policy decisions because agencies are ultimately accountable to the 
president, whereas courts are unaccountable); Lemos, supra note 114, at 449–50 (discussing the 
role of accountability in executive branch agencies in comparison to courts). 
 310. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT SCI. 
335, 338–39 (1974) (noting that agencies must go to legislative appropriations committees each 
year and that there is competition for limited funds); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, 
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade 
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 769–70 (1983) (discussing several mechanisms of congressional 
control, including public hearings and investigations, limited funding, and congressional control 
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In contrast, the Federal Circuit answers only to the Supreme Court. 
When the Federal Circuit takes power for itself from the PTO, the Federal 
Circuit further insulates policy decisions from public accountability. 
Consequently, clarity and uniformity come at a high price.
311
 
D.  Judicial Review of International Trade Commission Decisions 
The Federal Circuit’s agency-like behavior extends to the ITC. 
Although the Federal Circuit has granted Chevron deference to non-patent-
related ITC decisions, it has denied such deference to ITC patent 
determinations. The sole exception is Judge Newman’s opinion in Kinik 
Co. v. International Trade Commission.
312
 In dicta, the court stated that the 
ITC was entitled to Chevron deference when it decided that a defense 
under the Patent Act did not apply in ITC proceedings.
313
 This decision 
was extremely controversial and led to Senate hearings on the subject.
314
  
One important aspect of ITC adjudication is that it does not have a 
preclusive effect in district courts. Just under two-thirds of all patent cases 
litigated in the ITC are also litigated in a federal district court.
315
 One 
would think that this would give the ITC more power, because its decisions 
would bind subsequent district court litigation on the same patent. 
However, in 1996, the Federal Circuit held that ITC decisions are not 
entitled to preclusive effect.
316
 The court based this decision on legislative 
history from the 1974 Tariff Act, in which Congress stated that the ITC 
could only consider validity and enforceability when deciding whether 
§ 337 was violated.
317
 Consequently, even if an ITC decision leads to an 
undesirable outcome from the Federal Circuit’s perspective, it is free to 
                                                                                                                     
over appointments). 
 311. Some scholars have argued that patents are property-like, and that consequently, political-
based changes are bad. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor 
General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 548 (2010) (noting that granting the PTO stronger deference 
would undermine the stability of patent property rights, and that “[r]apid changes in patent policy 
could thus create the worst of all possible worlds from the standpoint of public policy, with little 
encouragement of real innovation and much litigation.”). However, even if we view political-based 
policy changes as detrimental, this does not change the fact that the Federal Circuit’s practice of 
denying the PTO and ITC proper deference poses separation of powers problems. 
 312. Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 313. Id. at 1363. 
 314. See Process Patents: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(statement of John R. Thomas) (testifying regarding controversy surrounding the Kinik decision), 
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/36. 
 315. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the 
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 70 (2008). 
 316. Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568–69 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
 317. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 196 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 
7329); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-571, at 78 (1974). 
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disregard the decision in PTO and district court appeals.  
In closing, the Federal Circuit’s review of PTO and ITC decisions does 
not resemble typical judicial review of agency decisions. The Federal 
Circuit minimizes deference to the agencies by misconstruing basic 
principles of administrative law. It actively interprets patent decisions as 
questions of law to avoid applying the correct standard of review.  
By minimizing deference, the Federal Circuit may be fulfilling its 
mandate of promoting uniformity in patent law. In doing so, however, the 
Federal Circuit loses sight of the fact that it is dealing with a coequal 
branch of government. These agencies are not the court’s alter ego, but 
instead are part of the executive branch that has been entrusted by 
Congress with policymaking powers. By taking these powers for itself, the 
Federal Circuit undermines separation of powers. 
IV.  THE STABILITY OF THE COURT–AGENCY MODEL 
When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it provided the 
court with tools to become a powerful force in patent law. Congress likely 
did not intend to alter the review of patent agency appeals, given that it was 
silent about the treatment of PTO and ITC decisions.
318
 Nor did Congress 
want to create an expert court, believing that appeals from non-patent 
agencies would keep the Federal Circuit balanced.
319
 Yet Congress clearly 
did want to create a court with enough power to prevent forum-shopping 
and to bring uniformity to patent law. 
The Federal Circuit did not take this opportunity for granted; over time, 
it assumed an agency-like position in patent law. With encouragement 
from the Supreme Court, it engaged in rulemaking by issuing mandatory 
bright-line rules that created clarity in patent law,
320
 at the expense of good 
policy.
321
 In doing so, the Federal Circuit filled a void left by Congress 
when it failed to grant the PTO full substantive rulemaking authority, and 
the Federal Circuit brought greater clarity and predictability to patent law. 
The Federal Circuit continues to engage in agency-like adjudication, 
sidestepping proper judicial review standards to allow for more hands-on 
review of PTO and ITC appeals. Such activity was unnecessary, given that 
                                                                                                                     
 318. See supra Section I.D. 
 319. H.R. REP NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981) (observing that the court would have “a varied docket 
spanning a broad range of legal issues and types of cases,” thereby preventing specialization). 
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the PTO and ITC were capable of performing their appointed roles. The 
court’s actions have, however, promoted the uniformity in patent law that 
Congress desired. 
Without Supreme Court intervention, this court–agency model could 
have continued to bring uniformity to patent law as a whole. This is not to 
say that such a model is preferable to the traditional one of having an 
agency administer the statute, since the court–administrator model 
necessarily sacrifices good policy making as well as the political 
accountability inherent in the executive branch. Rather, the model would 
have been stable, with the Federal Circuit wielding both executive and 
judicial powers. 
However, two current Supreme Court objectives are at odds with the 
model. The first objective is to curb the Federal Circuit’s use of mandatory 
bright-line rules. In justifying the need for flexible rules, the Court has 
emphasized the limitations in the Federal Circuit’s statutory interpretation 
powers. It is important to note that there is no evidence that Federal Circuit 
rulemaking violates the Patent Act or the will of Congress. Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit has clarified ambiguities in the Patent Act, not unlike how 
an agency clarifies its ambiguous organic statute through rulemaking.  
It is worth further exploration as to whether the Federal Circuit’s use of 
rigid rules violates separation of powers, particularly the nondelegation 
doctrine. Professor Margaret Lemos has discussed at length the problems 
with judicially administered statutes under a nondelegation doctrine 
theory.
322
 She observes that “[d]elegations to courts cannot be defended on 
the same functional grounds as delegations to agencies for the simple 
reason that courts are different from agencies in ways that are critical to the 
nondelegation debate.”323  
With regard to patent law, the Supreme Court appears to limit the 
Federal Circuit’s ability to create rigid rules when Congress has not 
expressly delegated interpretive authority to the Federal Circuit. As 
discussed above, the Bilski Court restated the principle that “courts should 
not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the 
legislature has not expressed.”324 It then went one step further, stating that 
courts do not have “carte blanche to impose other limitations that are 
inconsistent with the text and the statute’s purpose and design.”325 This 
emphasis on the metes and bounds of delegation to the court calls into 
question whether the Federal Circuit has overstepped its authority from 
Congress in issuing inflexible rules. The idea of the nondelegation doctrine 
                                                                                                                     
 322. Lemos, supra note 114. 
 323. Id. at 445.  
 324. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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playing a role in delegations to Article III courts has only begun to be 
explored.
326
 
The second Supreme Court objective that the Federal Circuit has run 
up against is the Court’s desire to unify administrative law. In Zurko, the 
Supreme Court rebuked the Federal Circuit for failing to apply the judicial 
review provision of the APA to appeals from the BPAI.
327
 The Court 
emphasized that it will recognize only exceptions from the APA that are 
explicitly created by Congress.
328
 This anti-exceptionalist position was 
reiterated in the Court’s 2011 Mayo Foundation decision.329 There, the 
Court held that Treasury Department regulations were entitled to Chevron 
deference, notwithstanding older precedent that provided less deference.
330
 
The Court stated: “We see no reason why our review of tax regulations 
should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same 
extent as our review of other regulations.”331  
The Court’s reiteration of uniformity in administrative law bodes 
poorly for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit’s manipulation of law 
and fact, its misconstruction of the Chenery doctrine, and its refusal to 
apply proper deference to the ITC all highlight forms of patent 
exceptionalism. These practices are therefore vulnerable to Supreme Court 
scrutiny, regardless of their promotion of uniformity in patent law. 
The competing objectives of Congress and the Supreme Court are on a 
collision course, and one or both branches of government will ultimately 
need to address them. If Congress wants the Federal Circuit to have 
agency-like power, it can impose stricter review standards for PTO and 
ITC decisions. Section 559 of the APA states that the standard of review 
provisions of the APA “do not limit or repeal additional requirements 
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.”332 The Supreme Court 
has noted that such a departure must be clear,
333
 so Congress would need to 
be explicit.  
Congress could also revise the Patent Act to state that the Federal 
Circuit has broad leeway to interpret ambiguous statutory language. 
However, such a move could result in backlash from the Supreme Court on 
constitutional grounds, perhaps for a violation of separation of powers—as 
                                                                                                                     
 326. For example, Professors Rafael Pardo and Kathryn Watts have recently discussed 
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was articulated in Chenery I—or for a nondelegation doctrine violation.334 
In closing, the success of the Federal Circuit’s unorthodox role of 
administrator has been undermined by Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s 
competing goals and competing interpretations of law. Congress will 
ultimately need to decide whether it wants to confront the Supreme Court 
to keep the Federal Circuit powerful, or whether it is time to turn full 
administrative responsibilities over to an agency. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit was established to bring uniformity to patent law 
through creating a single court to hear patent appeals. But in creating a 
specialized court with a mandate of uniformity, Congress inadvertently 
created an agency-like entity in the judiciary. The consequence has been a 
power struggle between the Federal Circuit and the executive branch, as 
well as between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. 
Part of the Federal Circuit’s behavior has been necessary. Rules 
decrease uncertainty and prevent repeated litigation on the same issues. In 
this regard, it is unclear whether the Federal Circuit has acted improperly. 
The Supreme Court’s series of interventions might be more accurately 
construed as an attack on Congress for granting the Federal Circuit too 
much power, as opposed to the lower court acting outside of its authority. 
However, the Federal Circuit is also actively taking power from the 
executive branch. It has fought against the confines of the APA, attempting 
to minimize deference to the PTO and ITC by fighting the application of 
the APA’s judicial review provisions and by construing issues as questions 
of law. It has furthermore disregarded the Supreme Court’s administrative 
law precedent in the Chenery decisions.  
One view is that the Federal Circuit is attempting to fill a void 
Congress created when it chose to not give the PTO substantive 
rulemaking authority. Congress’s failure to rectify the situation can only be 
viewed as deliberate, given that most complex statutes are administered by 
agencies with substantive rulemaking authority. Consequently, one can 
argue that the Federal Circuit’s heavy-handed review of patent agency 
appeals occurs with Congress’s tacit approval. 
A more cynical story, however, is that the Federal Circuit is actively 
taking power from the executive branch and is enriching its own status by 
deliberately weakening the PTO and ITC. By virtue of having immense 
power in a narrow area of law, the court has developed a cult of personality 
while largely escaping scrutiny for its actions.  
Whether the Federal Circuit is an accidental agency or a deliberate one, 
it is caught between competing goals of the Supreme Court and Congress. 
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Given the Supreme Court’s express desire to unify administrative law, it is 
likely that we will see more interventions when the Federal Circuit fails to 
give proper deference to agencies. This could force Congress to decide 
whether it wishes to fight for its Article III administrator, or whether it 
should utilize a more conventional route of granting an agency substantive 
rulemaking authority. 
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